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This dissertation contains four self-contained essays that explore the
application of stochastic and statistical modeling techniques to the problem of
optimal portfolio choice and financial time series analysis.
The first essay presents turnpike-type results for the risk tolerance func-
tion in an incomplete Itoˆ-diffusion market setting under time-monotone for-
ward performance criteria. We show that, contrary to the classical case, the
temporal and spatial limits do not coincide. Rather, we establish that they
depend directly on the left- and right-end of the support of an underlying
measure, used to construct the forward performance criterion. We provide
examples with discrete and continuous measures, and discuss the asymptotic
behavior of the risk tolerance for each case.
The second essay examines the long term behavior of the optimal wealth
and optimal portfolio weights processes in an Itoˆ-diffusion market under the
vi
time-monotone forward performance criteria. We show that the underlying
measure µ associated with the forward performance criterion defines the risk
profile of the investor, and in turn determines the optimal portfolio strategy
and optimal wealth in the long run.
The third essay considers two fund managers who trade under relative
performance concerns, depending on each other’s strategies, in an Itoˆ-diffusion
market, We analyze both the passive and the competitive cases, and under
both asset specialization and diversification. To allow for dynamic model re-
vision and flexible investment horizons, we introduce the concept of relative
forward performance for the passive case, and the notion of forward Nash equi-
librium for the competitive one. For homothetic forward criteria, we provide
explicit solutions for all cases.
In the fourth essay, we assess the dynamics of realized betas, relative
to the dynamics in the underlying market variance and covariances with the
market, using 5-minute high-frequency asset prices of the DJIA component
stocks from January 1, 2010 to December 31, 2014. We find that, unlike
the realized variances and covariances which fluctuate widely and are highly
persistence, the realized beta series, on the other hand, display much less
persistence. We then construct a simple autoregressive plus noise DLM time
series model for the realized beta, where the measurement error follows a
normal distribution centered at zero with asymptotically valid variance given
in [7]. This approach helps us obtain samples from filtered and smoothed true
underlying beta series and forecast future betas.
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Chapter 1
Temporal and spatial turnpike-type results
under forward time-monotone performance
criteria
1.1 Introduction
Turnpike results in maximal expected utility models yield the behav-
ior of optimal portfolio functions when the investment horizon is long, under
asymptotic assumptions on the investor’s risk preferences.
The essence of the “turnpike” result (stated, for simplicity, for a single
log-normal stock with coefficients µ and σ) is the following: assume that the
investment horizon is [0, T ] and that the investor’s utility UT behaves like a
power function for large wealth levels, i.e.,
UT (x) ∼ 1
γ
xγ, x large. (1.1)
Then, if this horizon is very long, the associated optimal portfolio function
pi∗ (x, t;T ) is “close” to the one corresponding to this power utility, i.e., for
each x > 0, t ∈ [0, T ] ,
pi∗ (x, t;T )
x
∼ µ
σ2
1
1− γ , T large. (1.2)
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In other words, the asymptotic spatial behavior of the terminal datum
dictates the long-term temporal behavior of the portfolio function for every
wealth level.
We recall that the function pi∗ (x, t;T ) is the one the determines the
optimal wealth process in feedback form, in that the optimal wealth process
X∗t , t ∈ [0, T ] , is generated by the investment strategy pi∗t = pi∗ (X∗t , t;T ) .
Turnpike results can be found in [20] where a continuous-time model
was first considered, and the turnpike properties were established using con-
tingent claim methods. Their results were later extended in [35] using an au-
tonomous equation that the function pi (x, t;T ) satisfies and arguments from
viscosity solutions. Duality methods were used in [22] for complete markets
and the incomplete market case was studied in [33].
More recently, the authors of [11] established the rate of convergence
in a log-normal model, showing that there exist a positive constant c and a
function D (x) , such that, for all x > 0,∣∣∣∣pi∗ (x, t;T )− µσ2 11− γx
∣∣∣∣ ≤ D (x) e−c(T−t).
A closer look at these turnpike results yields that we are essentially
working in a single investment horizon setting, [0, T ] , which is taken to be very
long. As a result, however, one needs to commit to a market model for this
long horizon, but this choice cannot be modified later on, if time-consistency
is desired. Furthermore, one pre-commits at initial time to a utility function
for very far in the future, T. We also remark that no matter how big T is,
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the optimal investment problem is not defined beyond this point, because the
utility function is given for T only.
Herein, we take an alternative point of view. Instead of committing
to a single long horizon [0, T ], we define an investment problem for all times
t ∈ [0,∞). Moreover, instead of choosing at an initial time the utility UT
for the remote horizon T, we choose the utility at this initial time. We also
depart from the log-normal setting and work with a general Ito-diffusion multi-
security incomplete market model.
We measure the performance of investment strategies via the so-called
forward investment performance criterion. This criterion was introduced by
Musiela and one of the authors in [55] and offers flexibility for performance
measurement and risk management under model adaptation and ambiguity,
alternative market views, rolling horizons, and others. We recall its definition
and refer the reader to, among others, [57], [59], for an overview of the forward
approach.
Herein, we focus on the class of time-monotone forward performance
criteria, studied in [58] and briefly reviewed in the next section. They are
given by a time-decreasing and adapted to the market information process,
U (x, t) , (x, t) ∈ R+ × [0,∞) , of the form
U (x, t) = u (x,At) ,
where u (x, t) is a deterministic function (see (1.14)) and At =
∫ t
0
|λs|2 ds,
with the process λt being the market price of risk. Note that U (x, t) is a
3
compilation of a deterministic investor-specific input, u (x, t) , and a stochastic
market-specific input, At.
The optimal investment process pi∗t turns out to be, for t ≥ 0,
pi∗t = σ
+
t λtr (X
∗
t , At) with r (x, t) := −
ux (x, t)
uxx(x, t)
, (1.3)
where σ+t is the pseudo-inverse of the volatility matrix, and X
∗
t , t ≥ 0, the
optimal wealth generated by this investment strategy pi∗t (cf. (1.12)). The
function r (x, t) is the (local) risk tolerance and will be the main object of
study herein.
Contrary to the classical case, in which a terminal datum is pre-assigned
for T and the solution is then constructed for t ∈ [0, T ) , in the forward setting,
the criterion is defined for all times, starting with an initial (and not terminal)
datum u0 (x) = U (x, 0) .
In analogy to the classical turnpike setting, we are thus motivated to
study the following question: if the initial condition u0 (x) is such that
u0 (x) ∼ 1
γ
xγ, x large, (1.4)
does this imply that, for each x > 0,
r(x, t)
x
∼ 1
1− γ , t large ?
There are fundamental differences between the classical and the forward
settings, for one is not a mere variation of the other by a time reversal. Rather,
the classical problem is well-posed while the forward is an inverse problem.
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Naturally, various properties used for the classical turnpike results fail, with
the most important being the lack of comparison principle for various PDEs
(cf. (1.14) and (1.22)) at hand.
The first striking difference between the two settings is the distinct
nature of the temporal and spatial limits. Indeed, in the traditional turnpike
results in [35] and [11], the temporal limit in (1.2) coincides with the spatial
one, in that for fixed time T0 and wealth level x0,
lim
x↑∞
pi (x, t;T0)
x
= lim
T↑∞
pi (x0, t;T )
x0
.
However, this is not the case in the forward setting. Indeed, the tem-
poral and spatial limits of the function r(x,t)
x
do not coincide. This can be
seen, for instance, in the motivational example in section 2.1.
The aim herein then becomes the study of the spatial and temporal
limits
lim
x↑∞
r(x, t0)
x
and lim
t↑∞
r(x0, t)
x
, (1.5)
for fixed t0 > 0, x0 > 0, respectively, under appropriate conditions for the
asymptotic behavior of the initial datum u0 (x) , for large x.
Pivotal role for determining these limits is played by an underlying
positive finite Borel measure, µ, which is the defining element for the con-
struction of the forward performance process. Indeed, it was shown in [58]
that the above function u is uniquely (up to an additive constant) related to
a harmonic function h : R× [0,∞) −→ R+, and, furthermore, the latter is
5
uniquely characterized by an integral transform, specifically,
ux (h (z, t) , t) = −e−x+ t2 with h (z, t) =
∫ b
a
ezy−
1
2
y2tµ (dy) , (1.6)
for 0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ ∞.
An immediate consequence of this general solution is that the initial
datum is directly related to this measure µ, in that (u′0)
(−1) needs to be of the
integral form
(u′0)
(−1)
(x) =
∫ b
a
x−yµ (dy) .
As a result, it is natural to expect that the asymptotic properties of
u0 (x) , which enter in the turnpike assumptions, are also directly linked to the
form and properties of µ.
Furthermore, this measure also appears in the specification of the risk
tolerance function. Indeed, we deduce from (1.3) and (1.6) that r (x, t) can be
represented as
r (x, t) = hx
(
h(−1) (x, t) , t
)
, (1.7)
with both hx and h
(−1) depending on µ.
The main results herein are that, if the support of the measure is finite,
b <∞, then the spatial limit coincides with the right-end point of the support
while the temporal limit with the left-end one, namely,
lim
x↑∞
r(x, t0)
x
= b and lim
t↑∞
r(x0, t)
x
= a. (1.8)
The first step in obtaining the above limits is to understand the connec-
tion between the asymptotic behavior of the initial (marginal) datum and the
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finiteness of the measure’s support. We study the following two cases, which
correspond to the spatial and temporal limits, respectively.
We first show that the asymptotic assumption (1.4), stated in terms of
the marginal,
u′0 (x) ∼ xγ−1, (1.9)
if and only if the right end of the measure’s support satisfies both b = 1
1−γ and
µ ({b}) = 1. In other words, condition (1.9) implies that the measure must
have finite support with its right boundary equal to 1
1−γ and, furthermore,
with a mass at this point. Conversely, for the measure to have these proper-
ties, condition (1.9) must hold. We then establish the first limit in (1.8) using
representation (1.6), the equation (1.14) satisfied by u (x, t) , and various con-
vexity properties of h and its derivatives. We stress that the requirement that
µ ({b}) 6= 0 cannot be relaxed. Indeed, we show in Example 6.2, where the
measure is the Lebesgue one, that the spatial turnpike property fails.
For the second case, we relate the finiteness of the measure’s support
with a relaxed version of (1.9). We show that if there exists γ < 1, γ 6= 0, such
that for all γ′ ∈ (γ, 1) and γ′′ < γ,
lim
x↑∞
u′0 (x)
xγ′−1
= 0 and lim
x↑∞
u′0 (x)
xγ
′′−1 =∞, (1.10)
then the right boundary of the measure’s support must satisfy b = 1
1−γ , and
vice-versa. This regular variation assumption is weaker than (1.9), needed
for the spatial limit and, naturally, yields a weaker result. Indeed, while the
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support has to be finite with right boundary equal to 1
1−γ , it does not need to
have a mass at 1
1−γ .
We in turn establish the second limit in (1.8), which is the genuine
analogue of the classical turnpike result. Obtaining this limit is considerably
more challenging than in the classical case due to the ill-posed nature of the
problem. Indeed, the methodology used in [35] is inapplicable because of lack
of comparison results for the ergodic version of the equation satisfied by r (x, t) .
The approach of [11] does not apply either because of the lack of connection
between the solutions of the ill-posed heat equation and Feynman-Kac type
stochastic representation of its solution. Therefore, one needs to work directly
with the function r (x, t) , which, from (1.7) and (1.6), is given in the implicit
form
r (x, t) =
∫ b
a
yeyh
(−1)(x,t)− 1
2
y2tµ (dy) ,
where however the spatial inverse h(−1) is involved.
The key step in obtaining the temporal limit is to show that
lim
t↑∞
h(−1) (x, t)
t
=
a
2
,
where a is the left end point of the measure’s support. Then the temporal
convergence in (1.8) and the rate of convergence is shown using the implicit
representation
r (x, t)− ax =
∫ b
a
(y − a) ety
(
h(−1)(x,t)
t
− 1
2
y
)
µ (dy) .
In addition to the general spatial and temporal convergence results, we
present two representative examples. In the first, the measure is a finite sum
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of Dirac functions while, in the second, it is taken to be the Lebesgue measure.
We calculate the limits of (1.8), and also provide asymptotic expansions for
the risk tolerance function.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we present the mar-
ket model, the investment performance criterion and a motivating example
demonstrating that the temporal and spatial limits do not in general coin-
cide. In sections 3 and 4, we analyze respectively the spatial and temporal
asymptotic behavior of the relative risk tolerance, while in section 5 we an-
alyze the asymptotic properties of the relative prudence function. In section
6 we present the two representative examples, and conclude in section 7 with
future research directions.
1.2 The model and the investment performance crite-
rion
The market environment consists of one riskless and k risky securities.
The prices of the risky securities are modelled as Itoˆ processes, namely, the
price Si of the ith risky asset follows
dSit = S
i
t
(
µitdt+ Σ
d
j=1σ
ji
t dW
j
t
)
,
with Si0 > 0, for i = 1, ..., k. The process Wt =
(
W 1t , ...,W
d
t
)
, t ≥ 0, is a
standard Brownian motion, defined on a filtered probability space (Ω,F,P) .
The coefficients µit and σ
i
t =
(
σ1i, ..., σdit
)
, i = 1, ..., k, t ≥ 0, are Ft−adapted
processes and values in R and Rd, respectively. We denote by σt the volatility
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matrix, i.e. the d × k random matrix (σjit ) , whose ith column represents the
volatility σit of the i
th asset. We may, then, alternatively, write the above
equation as
dSit = S
i
t
(
µitdt+ σ
i
t · dWt
)
.
The riskless asset, the savings account, has price process B satisfying dBt =
rtBtdt with B0 = 1, and for a nonnegative Ft−adapted interest rate process
rt. Also, we denote by µt the k-dimensional vector with coordinates µ
i
t and by
1 the k-dim vector with every component equal to one. The processes µt, σt
and rt satisfy the appropriate integrability conditions.
We assume that µt− rt1 ∈Lin
(
σTt
)
, where Lin
(
σTt
)
denotes the linear
space generated by the columns of σTt . Therefore, the equation σ
T
t z = µt− rt1
has a solution, known as the market price of risk,
λt =
(
σTt
)+
(µt − rt1) . (1.11)
It is assumed that there exists a deterministic constant c > 0, such that |λt| ≤ c
and that limt↑∞
∫ t
0
|λs|2 ds =∞.
Starting at t = 0 with an initial endowment x ≥ 0, the investor invests
at any time t > 0 in the risky and riskless assets. The present value of
the amounts invested are denoted by the processes pi0t and pi
i
t, i = 1, ..., k,
respectively, which are taken to be self-financing. The present value of her
investment is then given by the discounted wealth process Xpit =
∑
piit, t > 0,
which solves
dXpit = σtpit · (λtdt+ dWt) (1.12)
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with the (column) vector pit = (pi
i
t; i = 1, ..., k) . It is taken to satisfy the non-
negativity constraint Xpit ≥ 0, t > 0.
The set of admissible policies is given by
A =
{
pi : self-financing, pit ∈ Ft, EP
∫ t
0
|σspis|2 ds <∞, Xpit ≥ 0, t > 0
}
.
The performance of admissible investment strategies is evaluated via the so-
called forward investment performance criteria, introduced in [55] (see, also
[56], [57] and [59]). We review their definition next.
We introduce the domain notation D+ = R+ × [0,∞) and D = R ×
[0,∞) .
Definition 1.2.1. An Ft-adapted process U(x, t) is a forward investment per-
formance if for (x, t) ∈ D,
i) the mapping x→ U(x, t) is strictly increasing and strictly concave;
ii) for each pi ∈ A, EP(U(Xpit , t))+ <∞, and for s ≥ t,
U (Xpit , t) ≥ EP (U(Xpis , s)|Ft) ,
iii) there exists pi∗ ∈ A such that for s ≥ t,
U
(
Xpi
∗
t , t
)
= EP
(
U(Xpi
∗
s , s)
∣∣Ft) .
Herein we focus on the class of time-monotone forward performance
processes. For the reader’s convenience, we rewrite some of the results we
11
stated in the introduction. Time-monotone forward processes were extensively
studied in [58], and are given by
U(x, t) = u(x,At), (1.13)
where u : D+ → R+ is strictly increasing and strictly concave in x, satisfying
ut =
1
2
u2x
uxx
. (1.14)
The market input processes At and Mt, t ≥ 0, are defined as
Mt =
∫ t
0
λs · dWs and At =
∫ t
0
|λs|2 ds = 〈M〉t . (1.15)
The optimal portfolio process pi∗t is given by pi
∗
t = σ
+
t λtr(X
∗
t , At), where the
(local) risk tolerance function r (x, t) : D+ → R+ is defined as
r (x, t) := − ux (x, t)
uxx (x, t)
. (1.16)
Central role in the construction of the performance criterion, the opti-
mal policies and their wealth plays a harmonic function h : D → R+, defined
via the transformation
ux(h(z, t), t) = e
−z+ t
2 . (1.17)
It solves, as it follows from (1.14) and (1.17), the ill-posed heat equation
ht +
1
2
hzz = 0. (1.18)
Moreover, it is positive and strictly increasing in z. It was shown in [58], that
such solutions are uniquely represented by
h(z, t) =
∫ b
a
eyz−
1
2
y2t − 1
y
ν(dy) + C,
12
where a = 0+ or a > 0, b ≤ ∞ and C a generic constant.
The measure ν is defined on B+(R), the set of positive Borel measures,
with the additional properties that, for z ∈ R, ∫ b
a
eyzν(dy) <∞ and ∫ b
a
ν(dy)
y
<
∞. To simplify the presentation and without loss of generality, we choose
C :=
∫ b
a
1
y
ν(dy) and, also, introduce the normalized measure µ (dy) = 1
y
ν(dy).
Then, the function h has, for (z, t) ∈ D, the representation
h(z, t) =
∫ b
a
eyz−
1
2
y2tµ(dy), (1.19)
with
∫ b
a
yeyzµ(dy) <∞, a = 0+, a > 0, b ≤ ∞.
We easily deduce that for each t0 ≥ 0, the function h (., t0) is absolutely
monotonic, since ∂ih (z, t0) /∂z
i > 0, i = 1, 2... Such functions satisfy, for each
t0 ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, ..., the inequality
∂i+1h (z, t0)
∂zi+1
∂i−1h (z, t0)
∂zi−1
−
(
∂ih (z, t0)
∂zi
)2
> 0. (1.20)
From (1.17), (1.16) and (1.19), we obtain that the risk tolerance func-
tion is represented as
r(x, t) = hz
(
h(−1)(x, t), t
)
=
∫ b
a
yeyh
(−1)(x,t)− 1
2
y2tµ(dy). (1.21)
Furthermore, the first equality together with (1.18) yields that it satisfies the
(ill-posed) non-linear equation
rt +
1
2
r2rxx = 0, (1.22)
with r(x, 0) =
∫ b
a
yeyh
(−1)(x,0)µ(dy).
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We also have that
rx(x, t) =
hzz
(
h(−1)(x, t), t
)
r (x, t)
=
1
r (x, t)
∫ b
a
y2eyh
(−1)(x,t)− 1
2
y2tµ(dy) > 0. (1.23)
Furthermore,
rxx (x, t) =
1
r3 (x, t)
(
hzzz (z, t)hz (z, t)− hzz (z, t)2
)∣∣
z=h(−1)(x,t) > 0, (1.24)
where we used (1.20).
We note that we will frequently differentiate under the integral sign
in (1.19), which is permitted as explained in [58]. It can be also seen di-
rectly since, after differentiation, one can show that the relevant integrands
are jointly continuous in their respective arguments and thus uniformly lo-
cally integrable. This allows us to differentiate under the integral sign (see,
for example, Theorem 24.5 in [3] and the remarks following it).
As stated in the introduction, the aim herein is to investigate the spatial
and temporal limits in (1.5), with r (x, t) as in (2.13) when the measure has
finite support. We first provide an example which shows that, contrary to the
classical case, these two limits do not in general coincide.
1.2.1 A motivating example
Let the underlying measure µ be a Dirac function at 1
1−γ , γ < 1. From
(1.19) and (1.17) we have that, for t ≥ 0,
h(x, t) = e
1
1−γ x− 12( 11−γ )
2
t and ux(x, t) = x
γ−1e−
γ
2(1−γ) t.
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Therefore, the local risk tolerance function is given by r(x, t) = 1
1−γx
and thus the spatial and temporal limits coincide,
lim
x↑∞
r(x, t0)
x
=
1
1− γ and limt↑∞
r(x0, t)
x0
=
1
1− γ ,
for fixed t0, x0 respectively.
Next, let the measure µ be the sum of two Dirac functions at points
a = 1
1−θ and b =
1
1−γ such that b = 2a, with 0 < θ < 1 and γ < 1, i.e.,
µ = δ 1
1−θ
+ δ 1
1−γ
with
1
1− γ = 2
1
1− θ . (1.25)
Then, (1.19) and (1.17) yield that h(x, 0) = e
1
1−θx + e
1
1−γ x,
ux(x, 0) = 2
1−θ
(√
1 + 4x− 1
)θ−1
and u(−1)x (x, 0) = x
− 1
1−θ + x−
1
1−γ .
(1.26)
In turn,
lim
x↑∞
ux(x, 0)
xγ−1
= lim
x↑∞
22(1−γ)
(√
1 + 4x− 1)2(γ−1)
xγ−1
= 1. (1.27)
Moreover, expression (1.19) gives, for t > 0,
h(x, t) = e
1
1−θx− 12 1(1−θ)2 t + e
2
1−θx− 12 2(1−θ)2 t,
and, thus,
h(−1)(x, t) =
1
1− θ t+ (1− θ) ln

√
e(
1
1−θ )
2
t + 4x−
√
e(
1
1−θ )
2
t
2
 . (1.28)
In turn, transformation (1.17) yields
ux(x, t) = 2
1−θe(
1
2
− 1
1−θ )t
(√
e(
1
1−θ )
2
t + 4x−
√
e(
1
1−θ )
2
t
)γ−1
.
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Differentiating the above to obtain uxx(x, t) (or using (1.19), (1.28) and (2.13)),
we deduce that the risk tolerance function is given by
r(x, t) =
x
1− γ
√
4x+ e(
1
1−θ )
2
t√
e(
1
1−θ )
2t + 4x+
√
e(
1
1−θ )
2t
. (1.29)
Therefore, for each t0 ≥ 0,
lim
x↑∞
r(x, t0)
x
=
2
1− θ =
1
1− γ . (1.30)
while, for each x0 > 0,
lim
t↑∞
r(x0, t)
x0
=
1
1− θ . (1.31)
Therefore, the spatial and temporal limits do not coincide.
Next, we make the following two important observations. Firstly, note
that (1.25) yields that the support of the measure is
supp (µ) =
{
1
1− θ ,
1
1− γ
}
.
Therefore, the spatial limit coincides with the right-end of the support while
the temporal limit with the left-end one.
Secondly, for each x0 > 0 the temporal limit of the ratio
h(−1)(x0,t)
t
is
equal to half of the left-end point, since (1.28) yields
lim
t↑∞
h(−1)(x0, t)
t
= lim
t↑∞
(
1
1− θ +
1− θ
t
ln
(
1
2
(√
e(
1
1−θ )
2t + 4x−
√
e(
1
1−θ )
2t
)))
=
1
2 (1− θ) .
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In section 4 we will show that these two properties are always valid. In partic-
ular, we will see that it is the limit of the above ratio that plays the key role
in establishing the temporal turnpike limit for general measures.
To juxtapose the above results with the ones in the traditional expected
terminal utility setting, we compute the analogous quantities and associated
limits for the cases analyzed in [35] and [11] for log-normal markets. Without
loss of generality, we consider a market with a riskless bond of zero interest
rate and a single log-normal stock with mean rate of return µ and volatility σ.
To this end, we fix an arbitrary horizon T > 0 and, in analogy to (1.26),
we take the terminal inverse marginal utility, I (x) = (U ′)(−1) (x) , to be
I (x) = x−
1
1−θ + x−
1
1−γ ,
for x > 0 and θ, γ as in (1.25). This corresponds to terminal marginal utility
U ′ (x) =
(√
1+4x−1
2
)θ−1
and, thus, in analogy to (1.27),
lim
x↑∞
U ′ (x)
xγ−1
= 1.
We now consider the value function, say u (x, t;T ) of the associated
Merton problem, for t ∈ [0, T ] . Letting τ = T − t be the time to the end of the
investment horizon, we deduce, using well known results, that the function
u˜ (x, τ) ≡ u (x, T − t;T ) , satisfies, for (x, τ) ∈ R+ × [0, T ), the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman equation
u˜τ+
1
2
λ2
u˜2x
u˜xx
= 0.
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The inverse spatial marginal value function v˜ : R+ × [0, T )→ R+ then solves
v˜τ =
1
2
λ2x2v˜xx + λ
2xv˜x,
with v˜(x, 0) = I (x) . We easily deduce that
v˜(x, τ) = eατx−α + eβτx−2α,
with α =1
2
λ2 θ
(1−θ)2 and β = λ
2 1+θ
(1−θ)2 . Note that β > 2α.
Taking the spatial inverse of v˜(x, τ) yields
u˜x (x, τ) =
(
eατ +
√
e2ατ + 4xeβτ
2x
)1−θ
.
Therefore, the associated risk tolerance function is given by
r˜(x, τ) =
1
1− θ
 2x
1 +
√
1 + 4xe(β−2α)τ
+
8x2(√
e(2α−β)τ +
√
e(2α−β)τ + 4x
)2
 .
In turn, for each τ0 > 0 and x0 > 0, we obtain, respectively, the spatial and
the temporal limits,
lim
x↑∞
r˜(x, τ0)
x
=
1
1− θ and limτ↑∞
r˜(x0, τ)
x0
=
1
1− θ .
1.3 Spatial asymptotic results
We examine the spatial asymptotic behavior of the risk tolerance func-
tion as x ↑ ∞, for each t0 ≥ 0, under asymptotic assumptions for large wealth
levels of the investor’s initial risk preferences. In accordance with similar
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assumptions in [35] and [11], we impose this asymptotic assumption on the
marginal u′0 (x) instead of the function itself.
Assumption 1: The initial datum u0 satisfies, for some γ < 1,
lim
x↑∞
u′0(x)
xγ−1
= 1. (1.32)
The next result yields necessary and sufficient conditions on b, the right
end of the support of the measure, for the above assumption to hold.
Lemma 1.3.1. Assumption (1.32) holds if and only if the associated measure
µ satisfies
b =
1
1− γ and µ
({
1
1− γ
})
= 1. (1.33)
Proof. From (1.32), (1.17) and the fact that h(x, 0) is strictly increasing and
of full range, we have
1 = lim
x↑∞
ux(x, 0)
xγ−1
= lim
z↑∞
ux(h(z, 0), 0)
(h(z, 0))γ−1
= lim
z↑∞
(
h(z, 0)
e
1
1−γ z
)1−γ
. (1.34)
Therefore, representation (1.19) gives
lim
z↑∞
∫ b
a
ez(y−
1
1−γ )µ(dy) = 1. (1.35)
If a = b, then (1.33) follows directly. If a < b, then, it must be that a ≤ 1
1−γ ,
otherwise, we get a contradiction. In turn, for ε > 0,∫ b
a
ez(y−
1
1−γ )µ(dy) ≥
∫ b
1
1−γ+ε
ez(y−
1
1−γ )µ(dy) ≥ eεzµ
(
[
1
1− γ + ε, b]
)
. (1.36)
19
Sending ε ↓ 0 and using (1.35) yield that µ(( 1
1−γ , b]) = 0, and thus, supp(µ) ⊆
(a, 1
1−γ ]. Moreover, we have from (1.35) that
1 = lim
z↑∞
∫ ( 11−γ )−
a
ez(y−
1
1−γ )µ(dy) + µ({ 1
1− γ }) = µ({
1
1− γ }),
and we conclude. The rest of the proof follows easily.
We next state the main spatial asymptotic result.
Proposition 1.3.1. Suppose that the initial datum u0 satisfies the asymptotic
property (1.32). Then, for each t0 ≥ 0, the relative risk tolerance converges to
the right-end of the support of the measure µ,
lim
x↑∞
r(x, t0)
x
=
1
1− γ . (1.37)
Proof. Let t0 ≥ 0. From representation (1.36) we have that
h (z, t0) =
∫ ( 11−γ )−
a
ezy−
1
2
t0y2µ(dy) + e
1
1−γ z− 12( 11−γ )
2
t0 ,
and, in turn, the dominated convergence theorem implies
lim
z↑∞
h(z, t0)
e
1
1−γ z− 12( 11−γ )
2
t0
= 1. (1.38)
Therefore, from (1.17), together with the strict monotonicity and full range of
h(z, t0), we deduce that
lim
x↑∞
ux(x, t0)
xγ−1e−
γ
2(1−γ) t0
= 1, (1.39)
since
lim
x↑∞
ux(x, t0)
xγ−1e−
γ
2(1−γ) t0
= lim
z↑∞
e−z+
t0
2
hγ−1(z, t0)e
− γ
2(1−γ) t0
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= lim
z↑∞
(
h(z, t0)
e
1
1−γ z− 12( 11−γ )
2
t0
)1−γ
= 1.
Next, we claim that
lim
x↑∞
uxx(x, t0)
xγ−2e−
γ
2(1−γ) t0
=
1
γ − 1 . (1.40)
To prove this, it suffices to show that for any t0 ≥ 0, ux(x, t0) is convex since
the above would then follow from the arguments in Lemma 3.1 (ii) in [35]. To
this end, differentiating (1.17) yields
uxxx (h(z, t0), t0) (hz(z, t0))
2 + uxx(h(z, t0), t0)hzz(z, t0) = e
−z+ t0
2 . (1.41)
The strict convexity of h and the strict concavity of u then give
uxxx (h(z, t0), t0) > 0, (1.42)
and using the strict monotonicity and full range of h we conclude.
Combining (1.39) and (1.40) yields
lim
x↑∞
r(x, t0)
x
= lim
x↑∞
(
− ux(x, t0)
xuxx(x, t0)
)
= lim
x↑∞
(
− ux(x, t0)
xγ−1e−
γ
2(1−γ) t0
(
uxx(x, t0)
xγ−2e−
γ
2(1−γ) t0
)−1)
=
1
1− γ .
We stress that assumption (1.32), or equivalently (1.33), cannot be
weakened. Indeed, as we will see in example 6.2, where we take the measure
to be the Lebesgue on [a, b] , and thus there is no mass at b, the spatial turnpike
property does not hold.
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Corollary 1.3.1. Suppose that the initial datum u0 satisfies the asymptotic
property (1.32). Then, for each t0 ≥ 0,
lim
x↑∞
rx (x, t0) =
1
1− γ . (1.43)
Proof. From (1.24) we have that, for each t0 ≥ 0, limx↑∞ rx (x, t0) exists, and
we easily conclude.
1.4 Temporal (turnpike) asymptotic results
We investigate the temporal asymptotic behavior of the relative risk
tolerance as t ↑ ∞, for each x0 > 0, under asymptotic assumption of the
initial marginal utility for large wealth levels. This is the genuine “turnpike”
analogue of similar results in classical expected utility models and the main
finding herein. It shows that the relative risk tolerance will converge to the
left-end of the support of the underlying measure µ.
As in the spatial case, we first relate the properties of the measure to
the asymptotic behavior of the initial (marginal) datum.
Assumption 2: There exists γ < 1 such that for all γ′ ∈ (γ, 1) ,
lim
x↑∞
u′0 (x)
xγ′−1
= 0, (1.44)
while, for all γ
′′
< γ,
lim
x↑∞
u′0 (x)
xγ
′′−1 =∞. (1.45)
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As we show next, the above assumption is directly related to a con-
dition introduced in [36] and [22], for a discrete and a continuous-time case,
respectively.
Lemma 1.4.1. Assumption 2 is equivalent to the function u′0 (x) varying reg-
ularly at infinity with exponent γ − 1, i.e. for all k > 0,
lim
x↑∞
u′0(kx)
u′0(x)
= kγ−1. (1.46)
Proof. We first show that condition (1.46) implies (1.44) and (1.45). We argue
by contradiction. Suppose that (1.44) does not hold. Then, there exists γ′ ∈
(γ, 1) and ε > 0 such that for x large enough,
u′0(x)
xγ′−1 > ε. On the other hand,
condition (1.46) implies that, for all k > 0 and x large enough,
∣∣∣ u′0(kx)u′0(x)kγ−1 − 1∣∣∣ <
ε. Thus, for large enough x,
0 <
u′0(kx)
(kx)γ′−1
=
u′0(kx)
u′0(x)kγ−1
u′0(x)
xγ′−1
kγ−γ
′
< (1 + ε)
u′0(x)
xγ′−1
kγ−γ
′
.
Since γ − γ′ < 0, limk↑∞ u
′
0(kx)
(kx)γ′−1 = 0, and we conclude. Working similarly, we
establish (1.45).
Next, we show the reverse direction. Assume that (1.45) and (1.44)
hold. Then, for all δ, k > 0 and x large enough,
u′0(kx)
(kx)γ+δ−1
< 1 and
xγ−δ−1
u′0(x)
< 1.
Multiplying these two equations and rearranging gives, for all δ > 0,
u′0(kx)
u′0(x)
<
(kx)γ+δ−1
xγ−δ−1
= kγ+δ−1x2δ.
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Similarly, it follows from interchanging kx and x in the above two inequalities
that
u′0(kx)
u′0(x)
>
(kx)γ−δ−1
xγ+δ−1
= kγ−δ−1x−2δ,
and condition (1.46) follows by sending first δ ↓ 0 and then x ↑ ∞.
Assumption 2 is weaker than Assumption 1, and implies, as we show
next, that the measure µ has support with right-end point at 1
1−γ , but without
necessarily having a mass therein.
Lemma 1.4.2. Assumption 2 holds if and only if the measure µ has finite
support with its right boundary at 1
1−γ , namely,
inf {y > 0 : µ ((y,∞)) = 0} = 1
1− γ . (1.47)
Proof. We show that Assumption 2 implies property (1.47). For each γ′ ∈
(γ, 1) , we deduce from (1.44) that
0 = lim
x↑∞
ux(x, 0)
xγ′−1
= lim
z↑∞
ux(h(z, 0), 0)
(h(z, 0))γ
′−1 = limz↑∞
(
h (z, 0)
e
z
1−γ′
)1−γ′
,
and, thus,
lim
z↑∞
∫ b
a
e
z
(
y− 1
1−γ′
)
µ (dy) = 0. (1.48)
Next, observe that if b ≥ 1, then it will contradict the above limit, and thus
we need to have b < 1. Assume now that there exists γ′ ∈ (γ, 1) with b = 1
1−γ′ .
Then, for each γ˜ ∈ (γ, γ′) we have 1
1−γ˜ <
1
1−γ′ and the above gives, for ε small
enough,
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lim
z↑∞
(∫ ( 11−γ˜+ε)−
a
ez(y−
1
1−γ˜ )µ (dy) +
∫ b
1
1−γ˜+ε
ez(y−
1
1−γ˜ )µ (dy)
)
= 0.
Therefore, it must be that µ
(
[ 1
1−γ˜ + ε, b]
)
= 0. Sending ε ↓ 0, gives µ
((
1
1−γ˜ , b
])
=
0, which is a contradiction. Thus, we must have b ≤ 1
1−γ . Similarly, using (1.45)
we obtain that b ≥ 1
1−γ , and, thus, b =
1
1−γ .
To show the reverse direction, we first observe that property (1.47) and
the dominated convergence theorem yield that, for any ε > 0,
lim
z↑∞
h(z, 0)e−(
1
1−γ+ε)z = lim
z↑∞
∫ 1
1−γ
a
ez(y−(
1
1−γ+ε))µ(dy) = 0.
Then, setting γ′ such that 1
1−γ′ =
1
1−γ + ε, we deduce (1.44) for all γ
′ ∈ (γ, 1).
The rest of the proof follows easily and it is thus omitted.
We have so far established that under Assumption 2 the associated
measure µ has a finite right boundary (but not necessarily a mass) at 1
1−γ ,
and vice-versa.
We now turn our attention to the left boundary of the support, denoted
by a, where
a := inf{y ≥ 0 : µ ((0, y]) > 0}. (1.49)
In the upcoming proofs we will frequently use the identity
x0 =
∫ 1
1−γ
a
eyh
(−1)(x0,t)− 12y2tµ(dy), (1.50)
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for x0 > 0, which follows directly from (1.19) for b =
1
1−γ .
Lemma 1.4.3. Let h(−1) : D+ → R be the spatial inverse of h, and a as in
(1.49). Then, for each x0 > 0, limt↑∞ h
(−1)
t (x0, t) exists and, moreover, for
t ≥ 0,
a
2
≤ h(−1)t (x0, t) ≤
1
2 (1− γ) . (1.51)
Proof. Let x0 > 0 and observe that (1.18) yields
h
(−1)
t (x0, t) =
1
2
hxx
(
h(−1) (x0, t)
)
hx (h(−1) (x0, t) , t)
=
1
2
∫ 1
1−γ
a
y2eyh
(−1)(x0,t)− 12y2tµ(dy)∫ 1
1−γ
a
yeyh
(−1)(x0,t)− 12y2tµ(dy)
and thus inequality (1.51) holds, for all t ≥ 0.
To show that limt↑∞ h
(−1)
t (x0, t) exists, it suffices to show that h
(−1)
t (x0, t)
is decreasing in time. Indeed, direct calculations yield
h
(−1)
tt (x0, t) = −
∫ 1
1−γ
a
(
yh
(−1)
t (x0, t)−
1
2
y2
)2
eyh
(−1)(x0,t)− 12y2tµ(dy)∫ 1
1−γ
a
yeyh
(−1)(x0,t)− 12y2tµ(dy)
< 0.
(1.52)
Alternatively, differentiating h
(
h(−1) (x0, t) , t
)
= x0 twice yields, setting z =
h(−1) (x0, t) ,
h
(−1)
tt (x0, t)hx (z, t)+
(
h
(−1)
t (x0, t)
)2
hxx (z, t)+2h
(−1)
t (x0, t)hxt (z, t)+htt (z, t) = 0.
We have that both hx, hxx > 0, as it follows directly from (1.19) and differ-
entiation. Furthermore, the above quadratic in h
(−1)
t (x, t) remains positive,
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which would then yield that h
(−1)
tt (x0, t) < 0. Indeed,
h2xt (z, t)− hxx (z, t)htt (z, t) = h2xxx (z, t)− hxx (z, t)hxxxx (z, t) < 0,
as it follows from (1.20).
We are now ready to present one of the main findings herein, which
yields the limit as t ↑ ∞ of the ratio 1
t
h(−1)(x0, t). We show that it converges
to half of the lower-end of the measure’s support. Some related weaker results
can be found in [63].
Proposition 1.4.1. Let h(−1) : D+ → R be the spatial inverse of the function
h (cf. (1.19)) and let a, b be the left and right end of the support, respectively,
with a = 0+ or a > 0, and b < ∞. Then, for each x0 > 0, the following
assertions hold.
i) It holds that
lim
t↑∞
h(−1)(x0, t)
t
=
a
2
. (1.53)
ii) Let
∆ (x0, t) :=
h(−1)(x0, t)
t
− a
2
. (1.54)
If a > 0, then
|∆ (x0, t)| ≤ 1
at
ln
µ
(
[a, 1
1−γ ]
)
x0
 , if ∆ (x0, t) < 0, (1.55)
and
x0 ≥ µ ([a, a+ ∆ (x0, t)]) e 12 ta∆(x0,t), if ∆ (x0, t) > 0. (1.56)
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If a = 0+, then ∆ (x0, t) > 0, and, moreover, for each θ ∈ (0, 1) ,
x0 ≥ µ ([∆ (x0, t) , (1 + θ) ∆ (x0, t)]) e 12 t(1−θ2)∆2(x0,t). (1.57)
Proof. i). Let x0 > 0 fixed. Recall that h
(−1)
t (x0, t) > 0 (cf. (1.51)) and, thus,
limt↑∞ h(−1)(x0, t) exists. Moreover, rewriting (1.50) as
x0 =
∫ 1
1−γ
a
e
ty
(
h(−1)(x0,t)
t
− 1
2
y
)
µ(dy), (1.58)
we see that limt↑∞ h(−1)(x0, t) =∞, otherwise, sending t ↑ ∞ we get a contra-
diction. In turn, from Lemma 7 and L’ Hospital’s rule, we deduce that
A(x0) := lim
t↑∞
h(−1)(x0, t)
t
= lim
t↑∞
h
(−1)
t (x0, t), (1.59)
and thus
a
2
≤ A(x0) ≤ 1
2(1− γ) . (1.60)
Next, we claim that A (x0) <
1
2(1−γ) .
Let a > 0. If a = 1
1−γ , then a = b and h
(−1) (x0, t) = lnx
1−γ
0 +
1
2
1
1−γ t,
and the result follows directly.
Let 0 < a < 1
1−γ . Assume that there exists x0 such that A (x0) =
1
2(1−γ) .
Then, for ε > 0, there exists t0 (x0, ε) such that, for t ≥ t0,
−ε ≤ h
(−1)(x0, t)
t
− 1
2(1− γ) ≤ ε.
In turn, for δ > 0 small enough, the above and (1.50) yield
x0 ≥
∫ ( 11−γ−2ε−δ)−
a
ety(
1
2(1−γ)−ε− 12y)µ(dy) +
∫ 1
1−γ
1
1−γ−2ε−δ
ety(
1
2(1−γ)−ε− 12y)µ(dy),
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which yields a contradiction as t ↑ ∞, because the first integral would converge
to ∞.
Next, assume that there exists x0 > 0 such that
a
2
< A(x0) <
1
2(1− γ) . (1.61)
Then, for ε, δ > 0 small enough we have
a < 2(A(x0)− ε)− δ < 2(A(x0)− ε) < 1
1− γ . (1.62)
From (1.50), we then deduce that, for t ≥ t0(x0, ε), x0 ≥
∫ 1
1−γ
a
et(y(A(x0)−ε)−
1
2
y2)µ(dy).
If µ ({a}) 6= 0, then x0 ≥ e ta2 (2(A(x0)−ε)−a)µ ({a}) , and sending t ↑ ∞ yields a
contradiction. If µ ({a}) = 0, then
x0 ≥
∫ 1
1−γ
a
et(y(A(x0)−ε)−
1
2
y2)µ(dy) ≥
∫ 2(A(x0)−ε)−δ
a
et(y(A(x0)−ε)−
1
2
y2)µ(dy).
(1.63)
Consider the quadratic B (y) = y(A(x0)− ε)− 12y2. We have
B (y1) = B (y2) = 0, for y1 = 0 and y2 = 2 (A(x0)− ε) ,
B (y) > 0, for 0 < y < 2 (A(x0)− ε) , and B (y) achieves a maximum at
y∗ = A(x0)− ε.
Next, we look at its minimum, y∗ = mina≤y≤2(A(x)−ε)−δ ∆ (y) , and claim
that
y∗ = 2(A(x0)− ε)− δ. (1.64)
Indeed, if 0 < a ≤ y∗, then choosing δ < a, direct calculations yield ∆ (a) >
∆ (y∗) . If y∗ < a, then (1.62) yields a < y∗ < y2, and, thus, the minimum also
occurs at y∗.
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Clearly, because y1 < y∗ < y2, we haveB (y∗) = 12δ (2(A(x0)− ε)− δ) >
0. Therefore, for t ≥ t0(x0, ε),
x0 ≥
∫ 2(A(x0)−ε)−δ
a
etB(y∗)µ(dy). (1.65)
As t ↑ ∞, the right hand side of (1.65) converges to ∞, unless it holds that
µ ([a, 2(A(x0)− ε)− δ]) = 0. Sending δ ↓ 0 and ε ↓ 0, we then have
µ([a, 2A(x0)]) = 0,
which, however, contradicts (1.61). Therefore, it must be that that, for all
x > 0, A(x0) ≤ a2 , and we easily conclude.
If a = 0+, similar arguments yield that for every θ ∈ (0, A (x0)] , we
have that µ([θ, 2A(x0)]) = 0. Sending θ ↓ 0 yields µ (0, 2A (x0)] = 0, which
contradicts (1.61).
ii). Let a > 0.
If ∆ (x0, t) < 0, from (1.50) we have
x0 =
∫ 1
1−γ
a
ety(∆(x0,t)+
1
2
(a−y))µ(dy)
≤ eta∆(x0,t)
∫ 1
1−γ
a
e
1
2
ty(a−y)µ (dy) ≤ eta∆(x0,t)µ
([
a,
1
1− γ
])
,
and (1.55) follows.
If ∆ (x0, t) > 0, then (1.53) yields that, for ε small enough and t ≥
t0 (x0, ε) , 0 <
h
(−1)
(x0,t)
t
− a
2
< ε. Choosing ε such that ε < 1
2(1−γ) − a2 yields
0 < h
(−1)
(x0,t)
t
− a
2
< 1
2(1−γ) − a2 , and using that a < 11−γ , gives
a
2
+
h
(−1)
(x0, t)
t
≤ 1
1− γ .
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From (1.28) we then deduce that
x0 ≥
∫ a
2
+
h(−1)(x0,t)
t
a
e
ty
(
h(−1)(x0,t)
t
− y
2
)
µ (dy) .
The quadratic H (y) := y
(
h(−1)(x0,t)
t
− y
2
)
in the above integrand be-
comes zero at y1 = 0 and y3 = 2
h
(−1)
(x0,t)
t
> a and, therefore, its minimum oc-
curs at one of the end points a or a
2
+ h
(−1)
(x0,t)
t
. Note that a < a
2
+ h
(−1)
(x0,t)
t
< y3.
If it occurs at a, then H (a) = a∆ (x0, t) , while if it occurs at
a
2
+
h
(−1)
(x0,t)
t
, thenH
(
a
2
+ h
(−1)
(x0,t)
t
)
= 1
2
(
a
2
+ h
(−1)
(x0,t)
t
)
∆ (x0, t) >
1
2
a∆ (x0, t) .
Combining the above gives
x0 ≥
∫ a
2
+
h
(−1)
(x0,t)
t
a
e
1
2
ta∆(x0,t)µ (dy) = µ ([a, a+ ∆ (x0, t)]) e
1
2
ta∆(x0,t).
Finally, let a = 0+. Then, ∆ (x0, t) =
h(−1)(x0,t)
t
.
Recall that limt↑∞ h
(−1)
(x0, t) =∞, and thus h
(−1)
(x0,t)
t
> 0, for t large.
For ε ∈
(
h
(−1)(x0,t)
t
, 2h
(−1)(x0,t)
t
)
we then have
x0 ≥
∫ ε
h(−1)(x0,t)
t
e
ty
(
h(−1)(x0,t)
t
− y
2
)
µ (dy) ≥
∫ ε
h
(−1)(x0,t)
t
e
tε
(
h(−1)(x0,t)
t
− ε
2
)
µ (dy) .
Setting ε = (1 + θ) h
(−1)
(x0,t)
t
, (1.57) follows.
We are now ready to prove one of the main results herein.
Theorem 1.4.1. Let a be the left end of the support of the measure µ. Then,
for each x0 > 0,
lim
t↑∞
r (x0, t)
x0
= a. (1.66)
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Furthermore, there exists a function G (x0, t) given by
G (x0, t) :=

∫ 1
1−γ
a
(y − a)e−ty( y−a2 )µ(dy), ∆ (x0, t) < 0
2∆ (x0, t)x0 +
∫ 1
1−γ
a+2∆(x0,t)
(y − a)ety( 2∆(x0,t)+a−y2 )µ(dy), ∆ (x0, t) > 0,
satisfying with limt↑∞G (x0, t) = 0 and, for t large enough,
0 ≤ r(x0, t)− ax0 ≤ G (x0, t) . (1.67)
Proof. We present two alternative convergence proofs. The first yields (1.66)
while the second gives the rate of convergence G (x0, t) .
To this end, differentiating (1.17) gives
uxt(x0, t) =
(
1
2
− h(−1)t (x0, t)
)
ux(x0, t). (1.68)
Moreover, (1.14) and (1.16) imply that ut(x0, t) = −12ux(x0, t)r(x0, t) and, in
turn,
utx (x0, t) = −1
2
uxx (x0, t) r (x0, t)− 1
2
ux (x0, t) rx (x0, t) . (1.69)
Combining the above we deduce
1
2
rx(x0, t) = h
(−1)
t (x0, t), (1.70)
and from Proposition 8 and (1.59)
lim
t↑∞
rx(x0, t) = lim
t↑∞
2h
(−1)
t (x0, t) = a. (1.71)
On the other hand,
lim
c↓0+
∫ x0
c
rx(ρ, t)dρ = r(x0, t)− lim
c↓0+
r(c, t).
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Using the fact that, for all t ≥ 0, limx↓0+ r(x, t) = 0 (see [58]), we get that, for
x0 > 0,
r(x0, t) =
∫ x0
a
rx(ρ, t)dρ. (1.72)
Finally, we deduce from (1.70) and (1.52) that rxt (x0, t) < 0, and thus,
for x0 > 0, we have for y ∈ (0, x0], rx(y, t) ≤ rx(x0, 0). However, for all x0 > 0,
rx(x0, 0) < ∞. This follows directly from (2.13),(1.19) and the full range of
h (x, 0) , since
rx (h (z, 0) , 0) =
hzz (z, 0)
hz (z, 0)
=
∫ 1
1−γ
a
y2eyz−
1
2
t2yµ (dy)∫ 1
1−γ
a
yeyz−
1
2
t2yµ (dy)
≤ 1
1− γ .
Using the dominated convergence theorem and passing to the limit as t ↑ ∞
in (1.70), we deduce (1.66).
Next, we give the second convergence proof, which also yields the rate
of convergence. First note that
0 ≤ r(x0, t)− ax0. (1.73)
This follows directly from (2.13), (1.19) and (1.50), for
r (x0, t) =
∫ 1
1−γ
a
yet(y
h(−1)(x0,t)
t
− 1
2
y2)µ(dy) ≥ a
∫ 1
1−γ
a
et(y
h(−1)(x0,t)
t
− 1
2
y2)µ(dy).
Furthermore, from (2.13), (1.19), (1.50) and (1.54), we have
r(x0, t)− ax0 =
∫ 1
1−γ
a
(y − a)ety( 2∆(x0,t)+a−y2 )µ(dy). (1.74)
If ∆ (x0, t) < 0 (which occurs only if a > 0, as shown in the previous
proof), then the above yields
r(x0, t)− ax0 ≤
∫ 1
1−γ
a
(y − a)e−ty( y−a2 )µ(dy),
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and (1.67) follows directly with G (t) :=
∫ 1
1−γ
a
(y − a)e−ty( y−a2 )µ(dy).
Let ∆ (x0, t) > 0 and a > 0 or a = 0
+. If a = 1
1−γ , then the result
follows trivially.
For a < 1
1−γ , observe that for t large enough, 0 < a+ 2∆ (x0, t) <
1
1−γ ,
and thus representation (1.74) gives
r (x0, t)− ax0 =
∫ (a+2∆(x0,t))−
a
(y − a)ety( 2∆(x0,t)+a−y2 )µ(dy)
+
∫ 1
1−γ
a+2∆(x0,t)
(y − a)ety( 2∆(x0,t)+a−y2 )µ(dy).
Let C1 (x0, t) :=
∫ (a+2∆(x0,t))−
a
(y − a)ety( 2∆(x0,t)+a−y2 )µ(dy), and observe that
C1 (x0, t) ≤ 2∆ (x0, t)
∫ (a+2∆(x0,t))−
a
ety(
2∆(x0,t)+a−y
2
)µ(dy) ≤ 2∆ (x0, t)x0,
where we used (1.50). Thus
lim
t↑∞
C1 (x0, t) = 0. (1.75)
Let also C2 (x0, t) :=
∫ 1
1−γ
a+2∆(x0,t)
(y − a)ety( 2∆(x0,t)+a−y2 )µ(dy) and F (y, t, x0) :=
(y − a) ety( 2∆(x0,t)+a−y2 ), y ∈
[
a+ 2∆ (x0, t) ,
1
1−γ
]
. Then, F (a+ 2∆ (x0, t) , t, x0) =
2∆ (x0, t) , and thus limt↑∞ F (a+ 2∆ (x0, t) , t, x0) = 0. Furthermore, for each
y ∈
(
a+ 2∆ (x0, t) ,
1
1−γ
]
, we also have limt↑∞ F (y, t, x0) = 0. In turn, the
dominated convergence theorem gives
lim
t↑∞
C2 (x0, t) = 0. (1.76)
Setting G (x0, t) := C1 (x0, t)+C2 (x0, t) , and using (3.4) and (1.76), we obtain
(1.67).
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1.5 Spatial and temporal limits for the relative pru-
dence function
We now revert our attention to the relative prudence function p (x, t)
defined, for (x, t) ∈ D+, as
p (x, t) = −xuxxx (x, t)
uxx (x, t)
, (1.77)
with u solving (1.14).
Proposition 1.5.1. For (x, t) ∈ D+, we have that p (x, t) > 0. Moreover, the
following spatial and temporal limits hold.
i) If Assumption 1 holds, then, for each t0 ≥ 0,
lim
x↑∞
p(x, t0) = 2− γ. (1.78)
ii) If Assumption 2 holds, then, for each x0 > 0,
lim
t↑∞
p(x0, t) =

1 + 1
a
, if a > 0
∞, if a = 0+.
(1.79)
Proof. Using (1.77) and (1.16), we deduce that, for each t0 ≥ 0,
p (x, t0) =
x
r (x, t0)
(1 + rx (x, t0)) ,
and the fact that p (x, t0) > 0 and (1.78) follow directly from (1.23) and (1.37),
respectively.
From (1.77) and equation (1.14) we also obtain that, for each x0 > 0,
uxt (x0, t)
ux (x0, t)
= 1− 1
2
r (x0, t)
x0
p (x0, t) =
1
2
− h(−1)t (x0, t). (1.80)
Using that limt↑∞ h
(−1)
t (x0, t) =
a
2
we easily conclude.
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1.6 Examples
We present two representative examples in which the measure is, re-
spectively, a sum of Dirac functions and the Lebesgue measure. The first
example generalizes the results of the example in subsection 2.1, while the sec-
ond demonstrates that the spatial turnpike property fails if there is no mass
at the right end of the measure’s support.
1.6.1 Finite sum of Dirac functions
We assume that
µ =
N∑
n=1
δyn , with 0 < y1 < · · · < yN =
1
1− γ .
Then, h(z, 0) =
∑N
n=1 e
ynz and, thus, limz↑∞ h (z, 0) e−zyN = 1. In turn, (1.34)
yields
lim
x↑∞
ux (x, 0)
xγ−1
= 1,
which verifies the results of Lemma 2. We also have, for (z, t) ∈ D,
h(z, t) =
N∑
n=1
exp
(
ynz − 1
2
y2nt
)
.
(cf. (1.19)), and, therefore, for x > 0,
x =
N∑
n=1
exp
(
ynt
(
h(−1)(x, t)
t
− 1
2
yn
))
. (1.81)
Furthermore,
h(−1)(x, t)− 1
2
y1t ≤ 1
y1
lnx. (1.82)
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1.6.1.1 Temporal asymptotic expansion of h(−1)(x0, t) for large t
We claim that, for each x0 > 0, as t ↑ ∞,
h(−1)(x0, t) =
1
2
y1t+
1
y1
lnx0 + o(1). (1.83)
Indeed, using the limit (1.53), we have
lim
t↑∞
(
h(−1)(x0, t)
t
− 1
2
yn
){
< 0, 1 < n ≤ N
= 0, n = 1.
Therefore, as t ↑ ∞, all the terms in (1.81) vanish except for the first one, and
thus,
x0 = lim
t↑∞
exp
(
y1h
(−1)(x0, t)− 1
2
y21t
)
. (1.84)
Taking logarithm and rearranging terms yields (1.83).
1.6.1.2 Spatial asymptotic expansion of h(−1)(x, t0) for large x
We claim that, for each t0 ≥ 0,
h(−1)(x, t0) = (1− γ) lnx+ 1
2 (1− γ)t0 + o(1). (1.85)
To obtain this, we first establish that
lim
x↑∞
h(−1)(x, t0)
lnx
= (1− γ) . (1.86)
Indeed, fix t0 ≥ 0, let δ ∈ (0, 11−γ ) and assume that
lim inf
x↑∞
h(−1)(x, t0)
lnx
<
1
1
1−γ + δ
.
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Then, using (1.81) and that h(−1)(x, t0) > 0, for large x, we have
1 =
1
x
N∑
n=1
exp
(
yn lnx
(
h(−1)(x, t0)
lnx
)
− 1
2
y2nt0
)
≤ 1
x
N∑
n=1
exp
(
yn lnx
(
h(−1)(x, t0)
lnx
))
≤ Nx 11−γ h
(−1)(x,t0)
ln x
−1,
and using that 1
1−γ
1
1
1−γ+δ
−1 = − δ(1−γ)
1+δ(1−γ) < 0, we get a contradiction as x ↑ ∞.
Since δ is arbitrary, we deduce that
lim inf
x↑∞
h(−1)(x, t0)
lnx
≥ (1− γ) . (1.87)
Similarly, assume that for δ ∈
(
0, 1
1−γ
)
,
lim sup
x↑∞
h(−1)(x, t0)
lnx
>
1
1
1−γ − δ
.
Then, (1.82) gives
1 >
1
x
exp
(
1
1− γ lnx
h(−1)(x, t0)
lnx
− 1
2
(
1
1− γ
)2
t0
)
= x
1
1−γ
h(−1)(x,t0)
ln x
−1e−
1
2(
1
1−γ )
2
t0
and using that 1
1−γ
1
1
1−γ−δ
− 1 = δ(1−γ)
1−δ(1−γ) > 0, we get a contradiction as x ↑ ∞.
Since δ is arbitrary, we deduce that
lim sup
x↑∞
h(−1)(x, t0)
lnx
≤ (1− γ) , (1.88)
and we easily conclude.
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Next, we rewrite (1.81) as
1 =
N∑
n=1
exp
(
ynh
(−1)(x, t0)− 1
2
y2nt0 − lnx
)
(1.89)
=
N∑
n=1
exp
(
yn lnx
(
h(−1)(x, t0)
lnx
− 1
yn
)
− 1
2
y2nt0
)
.
Note that from the limit in (1.86) we have that
lim
x↑∞
(
h(−1)(x, t0)
lnx
− 1
yn
)
=
{
< 0, 1 ≤ n < N
= 0, n = N.
Therefore, as x ↑ ∞, the first N − 1 terms in (1.89) vanish, and we deduce
that
lim
x↑∞
exp
(
1
1− γh
(−1)(x, t0)− lnx− 1
2
(
1
1− γ
)2
t0
)
= 1.
We then obtain (1.85) by taking the logarithm and rearranging the terms.
1.6.1.3 Spatial and temporal asymptotics of r(x, t)
From representation (2.13), we have for the risk tolerance function
r(x, t) =
N∑
n=1
yn exp
(
ynh
(−1)(x, t)− 1
2
y2nt
)
. (1.90)
Let x0 > 0. Then, (1.82) gives
r(x0, t) ≤
N∑
n=1
yn exp
(
yn(
1
2
y1t+
1
y1
lnx0)− 1
2
y2nt
)
= y1x0 +
N∑
n=2
yn exp
(
1
2
yn(y1 − yn)t
)
x
yn
y1
0 .
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Therefore, the temporal asymptotic expansion of r(x0, t) as t ↑ ∞ is given by
r(x0, t) = y1x0 +O
(
e
1
2
y2(y1−y2)t
)
. (1.91)
Next, let t0 ≥ 0. Then,
lim
x↑∞
r(x, t0) = lim
x↑∞
N∑
n=1
yn exp
(
yn((1− γ) lnx+ 1
2 (1− γ)t0)−
1
2
y2nt0
)
,
and, thus, as x ↑ ∞,
r(x, t0) =
N∑
n=1
yn exp
(
1
2
ynt0(
1
1− γ − yn)
)
x(1−γ)yn + o(1). (1.92)
Therefore, for each x0 > 0 and t0 ≥ 0, we have the temporal asymptotic
expansion (1.91) yields
lim
t↑∞
r(x0, t)
x0
= y1 and lim
x↑∞
r (x, t0)
x
= yN =
1
1− γ ,
and these limits are consistent with the findings in Proposition 3 and Theorem
9, respectively.
1.6.2 Lebesgue measure
We consider a case of a measure with continuous support but without
a mass at its right boundary. We derive the associated limits and also show
that the spatial turnpike property fails.
• Lebesgue measure on
[
a, 1
1−γ
]
, a > 0
40
Consider the functions ϕ(z) := e−
z2
2 and Φ(z) :=
∫ z
−∞ ϕ(y)dy, for
z ∈ R. Then, representations (1.19) and (1.50) yield, respectively,
h(z, t) =
∫ 1
1−γ
a
eyz−
1
2
y2tdy =
ez
2/2t
√
t
∫ 1
1−γ
√
t−z/√t
a
√
t−z/√t
ϕ(y)dy, (1.93)
and
x =
∫ 1
1−γ
a
e
yt
(
h(−1)(x,t)
t
− 1
2
y
)
dy =
1√
t
e
h(−1)(x,t)2
2t
∫ 1
1−γ
√
t−h(−1)(x,t)√
t
a
√
t−h(−1)(x,t)√
t
ϕ(y)dy. (1.94)
1.6.2.1 Temporal asymptotic expansion of h(−1)(x0, t) for large t
We claim that for x0 > 0, as t ↑ ∞,
h(−1)(x0, t) =
1
2
at+
1
a
(
ln t+ lnx0 + ln
a
2
)
+ o(1). (1.95)
To show this, we first establish that
x0 = lim
t↑∞
ea(h
(−1)(x0,t)− 12at)
1
2
at
. (1.96)
Using (1.94) and that, for z < 0,
Φ(z) ≤ −ϕ(z)
z
, (1.97)
we have, for t large enough,
x0 ≤ 1√
t
exp
(
h(−1)(x0, t)2
2t
)
Φ
(
−a√t+ h
(−1)(x0, t)√
t
)
≤ 1√
t
1
a
√
t− h(−1)(x0,t)√
t
exp
(
h(−1)(x0, t)2
2t
)
ϕ
(
−a√t+ h
(−1)(x0, t)√
t
)
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=
ea(h
(−1)(x0,t)− 12at)
at− h(−1)(x0, t) .
In turn,
x0 ≤ lim inf
t↑∞
ea(h
(−1)(x0,t)− 12at)
at− h(−1)(x0, t) . (1.98)
Next, we show that
x0 ≥ lim sup
t↑∞
ea(h
(−1)(x0,t)− 12at)
at− h(−1)(x0, t) ,
which with (1.98) will yield (1.96). To this end, we use that for any b > a > 0,
the inequality
Φ(b)− Φ(a) ≥ 1
b
(ϕ(a)− ϕ(b))
holds. Let 1 < k < 1
a(1−γ) . From (1.94) and the above, we have, for t large
enough, that
x0 ≥ 1√
t
e
h(−1)(x0,t)2
2t
(
Φ
(
ka
√
t− h
(−1)(x0, t)√
t
)
− Φ
(
a
√
t− h
(−1)(x0, t)√
t
))
≥ 1√
t
1
ka
√
t− h(−1)(x0,t)√
t
e
h(−1)(x0,t)2
2t
×
(
ϕ
(
a
√
t− h
(−1)(x0, t)√
t
)
− ϕ
(
ka
√
t− h
(−1)(x0, t)√
t
))
=
1
kat− h(−1)(x0, t)
(
ea(h
(−1)(x0,t)− 12at) − eka(h(−1)(x0,t)− 12kat)
)
.
From Proposition 8 and since k > 1, we have
lim
t↑∞
eka(h
(−1)(x0,t)− 12kat)
kat− h(−1)(x0, t) = limt↑∞
eka
2t(
h(−1)(x0,t)
at
− k
2
)
at
(
k − h(−1)(x0,t)
at
) = 0.
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Therefore,
x0 ≥ lim sup
t↑∞
1
kat− h(−1)(x0, t)
(
ea(h
(−1)(x0,t)− 12at) − eka(h(−1)(x0,t)− 12kat)
)
≥ lim sup
t↑∞
eka(h
(−1)(x0,t)− 12kat)
kat− h(−1)(x0, t)−limt↑∞
eka(h
(−1)(x0,t)− 12kat)
kat− h(−1)(x0, t) = lim supt↑∞
ea(h
(−1)(x0,t)− 12at)
kat− h(−1)(x0, t) ,
and sending k ↓ 1 we conclude.
Next, we utilize the Lambert-W function W (x), defined as the in-
verse function of F (x) = xex, to derive the explicit asymptotic expansion
of h(−1)(x0, t) as t ↑ ∞. Recalling the notation ∆ (x0, t) = h(−1)(x0, t) − 12at,
we deduce from (1.96) that there exists ε(t) with limt↑∞ ε(t) = 0, such that
ea∆(x0,t)
1
2
at−∆ (x0, t) = x0(1 + ε(t)).
Rewriting it yields
a
(
1
2
at−∆ (x0, t)
)
ea(
1
2
at−∆(x0,t)) =
a
x0(1 + ε(t))
e
1
2
a2t,
Using that the left hand side is of the form F (a(1
2
at−∆ (x0, t))), we obtain
a(
1
2
at−∆ (x0, t)) = W
(
a
x0(1 + ε(t))
e
1
2
a2t
)
,
and, in turn,
∆ (x0, t) =
1
2
at− 1
a
W
(
a
x0(1 + ε(t))
e
1
2
a2t
)
.
It is established in [18] that the asymptotic expansion of W (x), for large x, is
given by
W (x) = ln x− ln(lnx) + o(1).
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Therefore,
∆ (x0, t) =
1
2
at− 1
a
ln
(
a
x0(1 + ε(t))
e
1
2
a2t
)
+
1
a
ln ln
(
a
x0(1 + ε(t))
e
1
2
a2t
)
+o(1)
=
1
a
(
ln
x0
a
+ ln(1 + ε(t)) + ln
(
1
2
a2t+ ln
a
x0(1 + ε(t))
))
+ o(1).
Using that as t ↑ ∞, ln(1 + ε(t)) = o(1) and that
ln
(
1
2
a2t+ ln
a
x0(1 + ε(t))
)
= ln
(
1
2
a2t
)
+ o(1),
assertion (1.95) follows.
1.6.2.2 Spatial asymptotic expansion of h(−1)(x, t0) for large x
Let t0 ≥ 0. We show that, as x ↑ ∞,
h(−1)(x, t0) =
1
2(1− γ)t0 + (1− γ)
(
lnx+ ln lnx− ln 1
1− γ
)
+ o(1). (1.99)
We first establish that
lim
x↑∞
h(−1)(x, t0)
lnx
= (1− γ) . (1.100)
Indeed, let f(z, t) := 1
z
e
1
1−γ z− 12( 11−γ )
2
t. Then,
lim
z↑∞
h(z, t0)
f(z, t0)
= lim
z↑∞
∫ 1
1−γ
a
zez(y−
1
1−γ )− 12 (y2−( 11−γ )
2
)t0dy
= lim
z↑∞
(∫ 1
1−γ
a
(z − yt0)ez(y−
1
1−γ )− 12 (y2−( 11−γ )
2
)t0dy +
∫ 1
1−γ
a
yt0e
z(y− 1
1−γ )− 12 (y2−( 11−γ )
2
)t0dy
)
= lim
z↑∞
(
1− e(a− 11−γ )z− 12 (a2−( 11−γ )
2
)t0 +
∫ 1
1−γ
a
yt0e
z(y− 1
1−γ )− 12 (y2−( 11−γ )
2
)t0dy
)
= 1,
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where we used that a < 1
1−γ and, for the third term, the monotone convergence
theorem. Therefore, for each t0 ≥ 0,
lim
x↑∞
h(x, t0)
f (x, t0)
= 1. (1.101)
We now use a result on the inverses of asymptotic functions (see [23])
to prove the limit in (1.100) by verifying the necessary assumptions for this
result to hold. To this end, consider the function g(z) := (1− γ) ln z, and
notice that
g(f(z, t0)) = − (1− γ) ln z + z − 1
2 (1− γ)t0 ∼ z, as z ↑ ∞.
Thus, limz↑∞ z−1g(f(z, t0)) = 1. Since, on the other hand, limz↑∞ f(z, t0) =∞,
we deduce that f (−1)(x, t0) ∼ g(x), as x ↑ ∞. Moreover, g(x) is strictly
increasing and the ratio gx(x,t0)
g(x,t0)
∼ 1
x lnx
= O( 1
x
), for sufficiently large x. It then
follows from the aforementioned result that g(x) ∼ h(−1)(x, t0), as x ↑ ∞, and
(1.100) follows.
Next, we claim that, for each t0 ≥ 0,
lim
x↑∞
e
1
1−γ (h
(−1)(x,t0)− 12 11−γ t0)
x lnx
= 1− γ. (1.102)
Indeed, for t0 = 0, we have from (1.94) that
x =
∫ 1
1−γ
a
eyh
(−1)(x,0)dy =
1
h(−1)(x, 0)
(
e
1
1−γ h
(−1)(x,0) − eah(−1)(x,0)
)
, (1.103)
and (1.100) yields that
lim
x↑∞
e
1
1−γ h
(−1)(x,0)
x lnx
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= lim
x↑∞
e
1
1−γ h
(−1)(x,0)
e
1
1−γ h
(−1)(x,0) − eah(−1)(x,0)
h(−1)(x, 0)
lnx
= 1− γ.
For t0 > 0, we deduce from (1.94) that
x =
1√
t0
e
−h(−1)(x,t0)2
2t0
(
Φ
(
1
1− γ
√
t0 − h
(−1)(x, t0)√
t0
)
− Φ
(
a
√
t0 − h
(−1)(x, t0)√
t0
))
.
(1.104)
Then, using (1.97), we have, for large x,
1 ≤ 1
x
√
t0
exp
(
h(−1)(x, t0)2
2t0
)
Φ
(
1
1− γ
√
t0 − h
(−1)(x, t0)√
t0
)
≤ 1
x
√
t0
e
h(−1)(x,t0)2
2t0
1
h(−1)(x,t0)√
t0
− 1
1−γ
√
t0
ϕ
(
1
1− γ
√
t0 − h
(−1)(x, t0)√
t0
)
=
e
1
1−γ (h
(−1)(x,t0)− 12 11−γ t0)
x(h(−1)(x, t0)− 11−γ t0)
,
and, in turn,
1 ≤ lim inf
x↑∞
(
e
1
1−γ (h
(−1)(x,t0)− 12 11−γ t0)
xh(−1)(x, t0)
h(−1)(x, t0)
h(−1)(x, t0)− 11−γ t0
)
= lim inf
x↑∞
e
1
1−γ (h
(−1)(x,t0)− 12 11−γ t0)
xh(−1)(x, t0)
lim
x↑∞
h(−1)(x, t0)
h(−1)(x, t0)− 11−γ t0
= lim inf
x↑∞
e
1
1−γ (h
(−1)(x,t0)− 12 11−γ t0)
xh(−1)(x, t0)
. (1.105)
Similarly, we use that, for a < b < 0,
Φ(b)− Φ(a) ≥ ϕ(a)− ϕ(b)
a
, (1.106)
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and deduce from (1.104) that, for large x,
1 ≥ 1
x
√
t0
e
h(−1)(x,t0)2
2t0
1
a
√
t0 − h(−1)(x,t0)√t0
×
(
ϕ(a
√
t0 − h
(−1)(x, t0)√
t0
)− ϕ( 1
1− γ
√
t0 − h
(−1)(x, t0)√
t0
)
)
=
e
1
1−γ (h
(−1)(x,t0)− 12 11−γ t0)
x(h(−1)(x, t0)− at0)
− e
a(h(−1)(x,t0)− 12at0)
x(h(−1)(x, t0)− at0)
.
For the second term, we have
lim
x↑∞
eah
(−1)(x,t0)
x(h(−1)(x, t0)− at0)
e−
1
2
at0 = lim
x↑∞
eah
(−1)(x,t0)−lnx
h(−1)(x, t0)− at0
e−
1
2
at0
= lim
x↑∞
exp
(
a lnx
(
h(−1) (x, t0)
lnx
− 1
a
))
1
h(−1)(x, t0)− at0
= 0.
Therefore,
lim sup
x↑∞
(
e
1
1−γ (h
(−1)(x,t0)− 12 11−γ t0)
x(h(−1)(x, t0)− at0)
− e
a(h(−1)(x,t0)− 12at0)
x(h(−1)(x, t0)− at0)
)
= lim sup
x↑∞
e
1
1−γ (h
(−1)(x,t0)− 12 11−γ t0)
x(h(−1)(x, t0)− at0)
− lim
x↑∞
ea(h
(−1)(x,t0)− 12at0)
x(h(−1)(x, t0)− at0)
= lim sup
x↑∞
e
1
1−γ (h
(−1)(x,t0)− 12 11−γ t0)
x(h(−1)(x, t0)− at0)
= lim sup
x↑∞
e
1
1−γ (h
(−1)(x,t0)− 12 11−γ t0)
xh(−1)(x, t0)
lim
x↑∞
xh(−1)(x, t0)
x(h(−1)(x, t0)− at0)
= lim sup
x↑∞
e
1
1−γ (h
(−1)(x,t0)− 12 11−γ t0)
xh(−1)(x, t0)
≤ 1. (1.107)
From (1.105) and (1.107), we then obtain
lim sup
x↑∞
e
1
1−γ (h
(−1)(x,t0)− 12 11−γ t0)
xh(−1)(x, t0)
= 1,
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which together with (1.105) gives (1.102). Taking the logarithm of both sides
then yields
lim
x↑∞
(
1
1− γ
(
h(−1)(x, t0)− 1
2 (1− γ)t0
)
− lnx− ln lnx
)
= ln (1− γ) ,
and the spatial asymptotic expansion (1.99) follows.
1.6.2.3 Spatial asymptotics of r(x, t0) for large x
Let t0 > 0. We show that as x ↑ ∞, the spatial asymptotic expansion
of r(x, t0) is given by
r(x, t0) =
1− γ
t0
x ln lnx+
1
t0
((1− γ)x lnx)a(1−γ) e 12a( 11−γ−a)t0
+
1
2 (1− γ)x−
1− γ
t0
x ln
1
1− γ + o(1). (1.108)
Indeed, from (2.13) and (1.93), we have
r(x, t0) =
∫ 1
1−γ
a
1
t0
(yt0 − h(−1)(x, t0))eyh(−1)(x,t0)− 12y2t0dy
+
h(−1)(x, t0)
t0
∫ 1
1−γ
a
eyh
(−1)(x,t0)− 12y2t0dy
=
1
t0
(
ea(h
(−1)(x,t0)− 12at0) − e 11−γ (h(−1)(x,t0)− 12(1−γ) t0)
)
+
h(−1)(x, t0)
t0
x,
where we used (1.50) for the last term. Then, (1.108) follows using (1.99).
For t0 = 0, we have from (1.103) that
r(x, 0) =
1
1− γx−
( 1
1−γ − a)eah
(−1)(x,0) − x
h(−1)(x, 0)
,
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and, for large x,
r(x, 0) =
1
1− γx
(
1− 1
lnx
)
+ o(1). (1.109)
From (1.108) and (1.109), we then obtain that for t0 > 0 and t0 = 0, we have
respectively,
r(x, t0) ∼ 1− γ
t0
x ln lnx and r(x, 0) ∼ 1
1− γx.
Therefore, the risk tolerance function does not have the spatial turnpike prop-
erty (1.37). Recall that the underlying measure lacks a Dirac mass on the
right boundary of the measure µ, which is a necessary condition for the results
in Proposition 3 to hold.
• The case a = 0+
We conclude with the case that µ is the Lebesgue measure on (0, 1
1−γ ].
For t0 ≥ 0, we easily obtain the same spatial asymptotic expansions of h(−1)(x, t0)
as in (1.99) and of r(x, t0) as in (1.108) and (1.109).
For the temporal expansion, we claim that as t ↑ ∞,
h(−1)(x0, t)
t
=
√
ln t+ 2 lnx0 − ln 2pi√
t
+ o(
1√
t
). (1.110)
To see this, first recall (cf. (1.50)) that
x0 =
∫ 1
1−γ
0+
ey(h
(−1)(x0,t)− 12yt)dy, (1.111)
Taking the logarithm of both sides of (1.111) yields
2 lnx0 =
(
h(−1)(x0, t)√
t
)2
− ln t (1.112)
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+2 ln
(
Φ
(√
t(
1
1− γ −
h(−1)(x0, t)
t
)
)
− Φ
(
−h
(−1)(x0, t)√
t
))
.
Next, we claim that l := lim inft↑∞
h(−1)(x0,t)√
t
= ∞. Indeed, if l < ∞, then, as
t ↑ ∞, the above yields
2 lnx0 = l
2 − lim
t↑∞
(ln t) + 2 ln(1− Φ(−l)) = −∞,
which is a contradiction. Therefore, it must be that l = ∞, which combined
with the fact that limt↑∞
h(−1)(x0,t)
t
= 0, implies that as t ↑ ∞, the third term
on the right hand side of (1.112) converges to 2 ln
√
2pi. Thus, we obtain
2 lnx0 = lim
t↑∞
((
h(−1)(x0, t)√
t
)2
− ln t+ 2 ln
√
2pi
)
,
from which we deduce that h(−1)(x0, t) =
√
t(ln t+ 2 lnx0 − ln 2pi) + o(
√
t),
and (1.110) follows.
1.7 Extensions
We have analyzed the spatial and temporal asymptotic behavior of the
risk tolerance function r (x, t). We recall that the optimal portfolio process
pi∗,xt is given in the feedback form pi
∗,x
t = σ
+
t λtr (X
∗,x
t , t) , with X
∗,x
t being the
wealth generated by it. Furthermore, it was shown in [58] that X∗,xt and pi
∗,x
t
are given in the closed form
X∗,xt = h
(
h(−1) (x, 0) + At +Mt, At
)
, pi∗,xt = σ
+
t λthx
(
h(−1) (x, 0) + At +Mt, At
)
.
It is then natural to investigate the long-term limits limt↑∞X
∗,x
t , limt↑∞ pi
∗,x
t
under asymptotic assumptions on the initial datum and the results obtained
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herein. The asymptotic behavior of these processes has been investigated in
[33] for the classical setting.
In a different direction, an interesting problem is how to construct in-
vestment policies which yield a targeted long-term wealth distribution. In a
static model, this question was analyzed in [65] and in the log-normal, clas-
sical and forward cases, in [54]. However, in these settings, there is a strong
model commitment, which is a nonrealistic assumption for long-term portfolio
management.
In the forward setting we have analyzed herein, the model is dynam-
ically updated. Furthermore, the distribution of the optimal wealth is given
explicitly, using the above formula, by
P (X∗,xt ≤ y) = P
(
h(−1) (x, 0) + At +Mt ≤ h(−1) (y, At)
)
= P
(
h(−1) (x, 0)
〈M〉t
+ 1 +
Mt
〈M〉t
≤ h
(−1) (y, At)
〈M〉t
)
,
where we used that At = 〈M〉t (cf. (1.15)). Therefore, one expects that the
limit (1.53) as well as results on strong law of large numbers for martingales
can be used to study the long-term distribution of the optimal processes. Such
questions are currently investigated by the authors in [29] and others.
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Chapter 2
On the optimal wealth and portfolio weights
processes under time-monotone forward
performance criteria in an Itoˆ-diffusion market
2.1 Introduction
This paper is a contribution to the forward portfolio theory where the
optimal portfolio choice is determined in an Itoˆ-diffusion market under the
forward investment performance criterion. This criterion was first introduced
by Musiela and Zariphopoulou in [55] and subsequently developed in [44, 56,
57, 59, 58, 60, 61, 73]. Under the forward performance criterion, an investment
strategy is considered optimal if it generates a wealth process whose average
performance is maintained over time. Such a criterion also offers flexibility for
performance measurement and risk management under model adaptation and
ambiguity, alternative market views, rolling horizons, and others.
Herein, we focus on the class of time-monotone forward performance
criteria, studied in [58], where the performance criterion U(x, t) is increasing
and concave in x and decreasing in t. Such performance criteria have the
following form:
U(x, t) = u(x,At)
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where u(x, t) is a deterministic function (cf. (2.5)) and At is the market input
process (cf. (2.6)). Central to the construction of u(x, t) is the choice of a
finite positive Borel measure µ and its Laplace-type transform h(x, t) given
in (2.9). In [58], the authors also obtain closed form representations for the
optimal wealth and the optimal portfolio processes given in (2.10) and (2.11).
We contribute to this line of research by establishing the long term
behavior of the optimal wealth and optimal portfolio weights processes of such
an investor. Our findings are twofold.
First, for the investor to avoid going bankruptcy eventually, the under-
lying measure µ of her forward performance must have a support with left-end
less than 2. This is consistent with the long term behavior of the wealth of an
investor with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) in a log-normal market.
We emphasize that such a condition on the measure µ does not prevent the in-
vestor from taking excessive risk. Rather, it allows the investor to de-leverage,
or take less risk, if the market condition deems necessary.
Second, we find that in the long run, the investor adopts the investment
strategy “closest” to the Kelly strategy within the bounds of her risk appetite.
For example, if the investor uses a measure µ that implies that her relative risk
tolerance coefficient is between 0.5 and 0.8, then in the long run, the investor
will adopt a strategy corresponding to the one associated with constant rela-
tive risk tolerance equaling 0.8. If we further impose the condition that the
relative risk tolerance coefficient is always less than 1, as evidenced by multiple
theoretical and empirical studies in economics, then the investor adopts the
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riskiest strategy within the bounds of her risk tolerance in the long run.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we present the market
model, the investment performance criterion, and the closed-form representa-
tion of the optimal wealth and optimal portfolio weights processes. In section
3, we analyze the long term behavior of the optimal wealth process and its
dependence on the underlying measure µ. We also compare our findings to
that of a classical CRRA utility maximizer in a log-normal market setting. In
section 4, we analyze the long term behavior of the optimal portfolio weights
process and its relationship with the underlying measure µ.
2.2 The model and the investment performance crite-
rion
The market environment consists of one riskless and k risky securi-
ties. The prices of the risky securities are modelled as Itoˆ-diffusion processes,
namely, the price Si of the ith risky asset follows
dSit = S
i
t
(
µitdt+ Σ
d
j=1σ
ji
t dW
j
t
)
,
with Si0 > 0, for i = 1, ..., k. The process Wt =
(
W 1t , ...,W
d
t
)
, t ≥ 0, is a
standard Brownian motion, defined on a filtered probability space (Ω,F,P) .
The coefficients µit and σ
i
t =
(
σ1i, ..., σdit
)
, i = 1, ..., k, t ≥ 0, are Ft-adapted
processes and values in R and Rd, respectively. We denote by σt the volatility
matrix, i.e. the d × k random matrix (σjit ) , whose ith column represents the
volatility σit of the i
th asset. We may, then, alternatively, write the above
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equation as
dSit = S
i
t
(
µitdt+ σ
i
t · dWt
)
.
The riskless asset, the savings account, has price process B satisfying dBt =
rtBtdt with B0 = 1, and for a nonnegative Ft−adapted interest rate process
rt. Also, we denote by µt the k-dimensional vector with coordinates µ
i
t and by
1 the k-dim vector with every component equal to one. The processes µt, σt
and rt satisfy the appropriate integrability conditions.
We assume that µt− rt1 ∈Lin
(
σTt
)
, where Lin
(
σTt
)
denotes the linear
space generated by the columns of σTt . Therefore, the equation σ
T
t z = µt− rt1
has a solution, known as the market price of risk,
λt =
(
σTt
)+
(µt − rt1) . (2.1)
It is assumed that there exists a deterministic constant c > 0, such that |λt| ≤ c
and that
lim
t↑∞
∫ t
0
|λs|2 ds =∞. (2.2)
Starting at t = 0 with an initial endowment x ≥ 0, the investor invests
at any time t > 0 in the risky and riskless assets. The present value of
the amounts invested are denoted by the processes pi0t and pi
i
t, i = 1, ..., k,
respectively, which are taken to be self-financing. The present value of her
investment is then given by the discounted wealth process Xpit =
∑
piit, t > 0,
which solves
dXpit = σtpit · (λtdt+ dWt) (2.3)
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with the (column) vector pit = (pi
i
t; i = 1, ..., k) . It is taken to satisfy the non-
negativity constraint Xpit ≥ 0, t > 0.
The set of admissible policies is given by
A =
{
pi : self-financing, pit ∈ Ft, EP
∫ t
0
|σspis|2 ds <∞, Xpit ≥ 0, t > 0
}
.
The performance of admissible investment strategies is evaluated via the so-
called forward investment performance criteria, introduced in [55] (see, also
[56, 57, 59]). We review their definition next.
We introduce the domain notation D+ = R+ × [0,∞) and D = R ×
[0,∞) .
Definition 2.2.1. An Ft-adapted process U(x, t) is a forward investment per-
formance if for (x, t) ∈ D,
i) the mapping x→ U(x, t) is strictly increasing and strictly concave;
ii) for each pi ∈ A, EP(U(Xpit , t))+ <∞, and for s ≥ t,
U (Xpit , t) ≥ EP (U(Xpis , s)|Ft) ,
iii) there exists pi∗ ∈ A such that for s ≥ t,
U
(
Xpi
∗
t , t
)
= EP
(
U(Xpi
∗
s , s)
∣∣Ft) .
Herein we focus on the class of time-monotone forward performance
processes. For the reader’s convenience, we rewrite some of the results we
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stated in the introduction. Time-monotone forward processes were extensively
studied in [58], and are given by
U(x, t) = u(x,At), (2.4)
where u : D+ → R+ is strictly increasing and strictly concave in x, satisfying
ut =
1
2
u2x
uxx
. (2.5)
The market input processes At and Mt, t ≥ 0, are defined as
Mt =
∫ t
0
λs · dWs and At =
∫ t
0
|λs|2 ds = 〈M〉t . (2.6)
Central role in the construction of the performance criterion, the opti-
mal policies and their wealth plays a harmonic function h : D → R+, defined
via the transformation
ux(h(z, t), t) = e
−z+ t
2 . (2.7)
It solves, as it follows from (2.5) and (2.7), the ill-posed heat equation
ht +
1
2
hzz = 0. (2.8)
Moreover, it is positive and strictly increasing in z. It was shown in [58], that
such solutions are uniquely represented by
h(z, t) =
∫ +∞
a
eyz−
1
2
y2t − 1
y
ν(dy) + C,
where a > 0 and C a generic constant. The measure ν is defined on B+(R), the
set of positive Borel measures, with the additional properties that, for z ∈ R,
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∫ +∞
a
eyzν(dy) < ∞ and ∫ +∞
a
1
y
ν(dy) < ∞. To simplify the presentation and
without loss of generality, we choose C :=
∫ +∞
a
1
y
ν(dy) and, also, introduce
the normalized measure µ (dy) = 1
y
ν(dy).
Then, the function h has, for (z, t) ∈ D, the representation
h(z, t) =
∫ +∞
a
eyz−
1
2
y2tµ(dy) with
∫ +∞
a
µ(dy) <∞, a > 0. (2.9)
Moreover, it was shown in [58] that the optimal wealth process X∗,xt of an
investor with initial wealth x > 0 under the forward performance criteria is
given by
X∗,xt = h
(
h(−1)(x, 0) +Mt + At, At
)
. (2.10)
The corresponding optimal portfolio process pi∗,xt is given by
pi∗,xt = hx
(
h(−1)(x, 0) +Mt + At, At
)
σ+t λt = r(X
∗,x
t , At)σ
+
t λt, (2.11)
where the (local) risk tolerance function r (x, t) : D+ → R+ is defined as
r (x, t) := − ux (x, t)
uxx (x, t)
. (2.12)
From (2.7) and (2.12), we obtain that the risk tolerance function is
represented as
r(x, t) = hx
(
h(−1)(x, t), t
)
=
∫ +∞
a
yeyh
(−1)(x,t)− 1
2
y2tµ(dy). (2.13)
and the relative risk tolerance function
rˆ(x, t) =
r(x, t)
x
=
∫ +∞
a
yeyh
(−1)(x,t)− 1
2
y2tµ(dy)∫ +∞
a
eyh
(−1)(x,t)− 1
2
y2tµ(dy)
. (2.14)
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Therefore, the optimal portfolio weights process pˆi∗,xt is given by
pˆi∗,xt :=
pi∗,xt
X∗,xt
= rˆ(X∗,xt , At)σ
+
t λt (2.15)
where rˆ is given in (2.14).
2.3 Long term behavior of optimal wealth process
Following (2.10), we can represent the optimal wealth process X∗,xt as
follows.
X∗,xt =
∫ +∞
a
ey(h
(−1)(x,0)+Mt+At)− 12y2Atµ(dy)
=
∫ +∞
a
ey(Mt+At)−
1
2
y2Atµx(dy) (2.16)
where the measure µx is a finite positive Borel measure such that for any
A ∈ [a,+∞),
µx(A) =
∫
A
eyh
(−1)(x,0)µ(dy). (2.17)
In particular, µx([a,+∞)) = x. Notice the integrand in (2.16) is the optimal
wealth process of an investor with initial wealth $1 and constant relative risk
tolerance of y, and thus we denote it
Xt(δy) := e
y(Mt+At)− 12y2At (2.18)
Before we state the main theorem, we remind the reader of the definition
of lower and upper class functions introduced by P. Lev´y. Recall Blumenthal’s
0-1 law implies that for any positive increasing continuous function φ(t), the
probability
p := P(Wt ≤ φ(t), t ↑ ∞) (2.19)
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is either 0 or 1. Following P. Le´vy [48], we say that
Definition 2.3.1. An increasing function φ(t) belongs to the upper class (de-
noted by U) if p = 1 and the lower class (denoted by L) if p = 0, where p is
given in (2.19).
One can determine whether a function φ(t) belongs to the upper or
lower class by resorting to the Kolmogorov’s test (see Page 36 of [37]). For
more details on the upper and lower classes and their connection to the law of
iterated logarithms, we refer the readers to [24, 26, 37]. The following theorem
connects the long term behavior of the optimal wealth process X∗,xt with the
left-end of the support of the measure µ. In the case where the left-end equals
2, we show that the limiting behavior of X∗,xt hinges on whether the inverse
function of a certain transform of the measure µ belongs to the lower or upper
class.
Theorem 2.3.1. Let a be the left-end of the support of the measure µ, and
X∗t be the optimal wealth process. Then, the following assertions hold.
1. If a > 2, then
lim
t↑∞
X∗t = 0, a.s. (2.20)
2. If a < 2, then
lim
t↑∞
X∗t = +∞, a.s. (2.21)
3. In the case where a = 2, define the function G : D→ R+ by
G(z, t) :=
∫ +∞
2
eyz+y(1−
y
2
)tµx(dy) (2.22)
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and G(−1)(z, t) its spatial inverse. The following dichotomy holds.
(a) If G(−1)(z, t) ∈ L for all z > 0, then
lim inf
t↑∞
X∗t = 0 and lim sup
t↑∞
X∗t = +∞, a.s. (2.23)
(b) Otherwise, G(−1)(z, t) ∈ U for all z > 0, and (2.20) holds.
Proof. From (2.2), we have limt↑∞ MtAt = 0, a.s. by the law of large numbers
for local martingales. Therefore, we take Ω′ ⊂ Ω with P(Ω′) = 1 such that for
ω ∈ Ω′,
lim
t↑∞
At(ω) = +∞, lim inf
t↑∞
Mt(ω) = −∞, lim sup
t↑∞
Mt(ω) = +∞, lim
t↑∞
Mt
At
(ω) = 0.
(2.24)
In what follows, we let ω ∈ Ω′ and omit the ω-dependence in all processes to
ease the notation. We have
lim
t↑∞
Xt(δy) = lim
t↑∞
e
yAt(
Mt
At
+1− y
2
)
=
{
+∞ if y < 2
0 if y > 2.
(2.25)
For y = 2, Xt(δ2) = e
2Mt and thus, from (2.24),
lim sup
t↑∞
Xt(δ2) = +∞ and lim inf
t↑∞
Xt(δ2) = 0 (2.26)
We now present the long term behavior of X∗t in three different cases.
(1) If a > 2, then for y ∈ [a,+∞) and t > 0, it is easy to check that
Xt(δy) ≤ Xt(δa). Then, (2.20) follows from (2.25) and dominated convergence
theorem.
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(2) If a < 2, then it follows from (2.25) that, as t ↑ ∞,
X∗t ≥
∫ 2−
a
Xt(δy)µx(dy)→ +∞,
and we conclude with (2.21).
(3) In the case where a = 2, we first show that
lim inf
t↑∞
X∗t = 0. (2.27)
To see this, notice that for t > 0,
0 ≤ X∗t ≤ e2Mtµx([2,+∞)) = xe2Mt
and (2.27) follows from (2.24).
Next, we show that
lim sup
t↑∞
X∗t = lim sup
t↑∞
G(Wt, t) (2.28)
where G is defined in (2.22). To see this, notice that from (2.24), we have
lim sup
t↑∞
X∗t = lim sup
t↑∞
G(Mt, At) = lim sup
At↑∞
G(WAt , At) = lim sup
t↑∞
G(Wt, t)
where we use the DDS theorem for Mt = WAt in the second equality.
To show the dichotomy, suppose G(−1)(z0, t) ∈ L for some z0 > 0. It
follows from (2.19), G(·, t) being a strictly increasing function, and Definition
2.3.1 that
P
(
lim sup
t↑∞
G(Wt, t) > z0
)
= P
(
Wt > G
(−1)(z0, t) infinitely often
)
= 1.
(2.29)
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Now we proceed to show that (2.29) is true for all z > 0 and hence, whether
G(−1)(z, t) belongs to the lower or upper class is independent of the value of
z. To see that, note for z > 0,
∂
∂z
G(−1)(z, t) =
1
Gz(G(−1)(z, t), t)
=
1∫ +∞
2
yeyG
(−1)(z,t)+y(1− y
2
)tµx(dy)
≤ 1
2z
.
Thus, for fixed t > 0 and z1 > 0, we have
G(−1)(z1, t)−G(−1)(z0, t) =
∫ z1
z0
∂
∂z
G(−1)(z, t)dz ≤
∫ z1
z0
1
2z
dz =
1
2
ln
(
z1
z0
)
.
It follows from (2.29) that for any z1 > 0,
lim sup
t↑∞
Wt
G(−1)(z1, t)
≥ lim sup
t↑∞
Wt
G(−1)(z0, t) + 12 ln(z1/z0)
= lim sup
t↑∞
Wt
G(−1)(z0, t)
> 1
Therefore,
P
(
lim sup
t↑∞
G(Wt, t) > z1
)
= 1, ∀z1 > 0 (2.30)
and (2.23) follows from (2.27), (2.28), and (2.30).
Otherwise, G(−1)(z, t) ∈ U for all z > 0. In a similar fashion, we have
P
(
lim sup
t↑∞
G(Wt, t) ≤ z
)
= P
(
Wt ≤ G(−1)(z, t), t ↑ ∞
)
= 1, (2.31)
for all z > 0, and (2.20) follows from (2.27), (2.28), and (2.31).
The crux of the preceding theorem is a, the left-end of support of
measure µ. It is clear from (2.14) that the relative risk tolerance function
rˆ(x, t) ≥ a for any x > 0, t ≥ 0. Therefore, a direct implication of Theorem
2.3.1 is that
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If the investor’s relative risk tolerance coefficient is always greater
than 2, then her wealth will go down to 0 eventually.
This is not surprising considering the following analogous result in a log-normal
market under the classical CRRA criteria.
In a market with one riskless asset of constant interest rate and one
risky asset with constant volatility σ and Sharpe ratio λ. An investor with
initial wealth x > 0 has a CRRA utility function at terminal time T > 0 given
by
U(x) =

x1−γ − 1
1− γ , γ > 0 and γ 6= 1
log x, γ = 1
Notice that the relative risk tolerance coefficient for such an investor is given
by
− U
′(x)
xU ′′(x)
=
1
γ
.
It is well known the discounted optimal wealth at time t > 0 is given by
X∗,xt = x exp
(
1
γ
(1− 1
2γ
)λ2t+
1
γ
λWt
)
Therefore, we have the analagous long-term behavior of X∗,xt
1. If 1
γ
> 2, then limt↑∞X
∗,x
t = 0, a.s.
2. If 1
γ
< 2, then limt↑∞X
∗,x
t = +∞, a.s.
3. If the relative risk tolerance 1
γ
= 2, then X∗,xt = x exp(2λWt), which
satisfies
lim sup
t↑∞
X∗,xt = +∞ and lim inf
t↑∞
X∗,xt = 0
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The authors show in [30] that under the time-monotone forward performance
criteria, the temporal limit of the relative risk tolerance function rˆ(x, t) is
exactly a, the left-end of the measure’s support µ, i.e.
lim
t↑∞
rˆ(x, t) = a.
for any x > 0. This implies in the long run, a forward investor’s risk preference
is the same as that of an investor with constant relative risk tolerance a.
Therefore, it is no surprise that the optimal wealth of these two investors
share the same long term behavior.
2.4 Long term behavior of optimal portfolio weights
process
Recall that the optimal portfolio weights process of an investor with
initial wealth x > 0 is given in (2.15) as
pˆi∗,xt :=
pi∗,xt
X∗,xt
= rˆ(X∗,xt , At)σ
+
t λt,
and following (2.15) and (2.18), the relative risk tolerance process rˆ(X∗,xt , At)
is given by
rˆ(X∗,xt , At) =
r(X∗,xt , At)
X∗,xt
=
∫ +∞
a
yXt(δy)µx(dy)∫ +∞
a
Xt(δy)µx(dy)
. (2.32)
where µx is the same as in (2.17). From (2.32), the relative risk tolerance
process can be interpreted as the expected value of a continuum of relative
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risk tolerance coefficients in [a,+∞) with respect to a time-changing random
probability measure.
The following theorem shows that in the long run, the investor places a
fraction of her wealth in the tangency stock portfolio σ+t λt where the fraction
is equal to the point in the support of measure µ closest to 1. In other words,
the investor adopts the portfolio strategy “closest” to the renowned growth
optimal, or Kelly, strategy [45] within the bounds of her risk appetite.
Theorem 2.4.1. Suppose there is a unique c in the support of measure µ that
is closest to 1, i.e.
c := arg min
y∈supp(µ)
|y − 1|.
Then,
lim
t↑∞
rˆ(X∗,xt , At) = c, a.s. (2.33)
and
lim
t↑∞
pˆi∗,xt
c · σ+t λt
= 1, a.s. (2.34)
Proof. As in the previous theorem, we take Ω′ ⊂ Ω with P(Ω′) = 1 such that
for ω ∈ Ω′,
lim
t↑∞
At(ω) = +∞, lim inf
t↑∞
Mt(ω) = −∞, lim sup
t↑∞
Mt(ω) = +∞, lim
t↑∞
Mt(ω)
At(ω)
= 0.
(2.35)
First, note that (2.34) follows directly from (2.33) and (2.15). We now prove
(2.33) in two different cases where c 6= 1 and c = 1, respectively. In what
follows, we let ω ∈ Ω′ and omit the ω-dependence in all processes to ease the
notation.
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Case 1. Suppose c 6= 1. Without loss of generality, we suppose c < 1
and denote d the point in the support of µ to the right of 1 that is closet to 1,
i.e.
d := arg min
y∈supp(µ)∩[1,+∞)
|y − 1|
and 0 < 1− c < d− 1. Then support of µ is a subset of [a, c] ∪ [d,+∞).
Let  ∈ (0,min{1 − c, d−1−(1−c)
4
}). For t large enough, we have |Mt/At| < ,
and observe that the fraction
Xt(δy)
Xt(δc−)
= exp
(
(y − (c− ))At
(
Mt
At
+ 1− y + c− 
2
))
has the following limits:
(1) For y ∈ [a, c− ), Mt
At
+ 1− y+c−
2
> −+ 1− (c− ) = 1− c, and,
0 ≤ lim
t↑∞
Xt(δy)
Xt(δc−)
≤ lim
t↑∞
exp ((y − (c− ))At(1− c)) = 0;
(2) For y ∈ (c − , c], Mt
At
+ 1 − y+c−
2
> − + 1 − c+c−
2
= 1 − c − 
2
> 1−c
2
,
and,
lim
t↑∞
Xt(δy)
Xt(δc−)
≥ lim
t↑∞
exp
(
(y − (c− ))At1− c
2
)
= +∞;
(3) For y ∈ [d,+∞), Mt
At
+ 1 − y+c−
2
<  + 1 − d+c−
2
= 3
2
 − d−1−(1−c)
2
<
3
2
− 2 = −1
2
, and,
0 ≤ lim
t↑∞
Xt(δy)
Xt(δc−)
≤ lim
t↑∞
exp
(
−1
2
(y − (c− ))At
)
= 0.
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It follows from dominated convergence theorem that
lim
t↑∞
∫
L
Xt(δy)
Xt(δc−)
µx(dy) = lim
t↑∞
∫
L
y
Xt(δy)
Xt(δc−)
µx(dy)
=

0 if L = [a, c− ) ∪ [d,+∞)
+∞ if L = (c− , c]
(2.36)
Thus, in the following expression,
rˆ(X∗t , At) =
∫ +∞
a
yXt(δy)µx(dy)∫ +∞
a
Xt(δy)µx(dy)
=
∫ +∞
a
y
Xt(δy)
Xt(δc−)
µx(dy)∫ +∞
a
Xt(δy)
Xt(δc−)
µx(dy)
=
(∫ (c−)+
a
+
∫ c
(c−)−
+
∫ +∞
d
)
y
Xt(δy)
Xt(δc−)
µx(dy) + (c− )µx({c− })(∫ (c−)+
a
+
∫ c
(c−)−
+
∫ +∞
d
)
Xt(δy)
Xt(δc−)
µx(dy) + µx({c− })
the integrals
∫ c
(c−)− dominate other terms in both the numerator and denom-
inator. In addition,
c−  <
∫ c
(c−)−
y
Xt(δy)
Xt(δc−)
µx(dy)∫ c
(c−)−
Xt(δy)
Xt(δc−)
µx(dy)
≤ c.
Therefore, it follows that
c−  ≤ lim
t↑∞
rˆ(X∗t , At) ≤ c,
and (2.33) follows as  is arbitrary and P(Ω′) = 1.
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Case 2. Suppose c = 1. Then 1 ∈ supp(µ). Let  > 0, we must have
µ((1− , 1 + )) > 0. For t large enough, we have |Mt/At| < 2 . For simplicity,
denote the process
lt =
Mt
At
+ 1.
Observe that the fraction
Xt(δy)
Xt(δlt−)
= exp
{
(y − (lt − ))At
(
lt − y + lt − 
2
)}
= exp
{
−1
2
At(y − (lt − ))(y − (lt + ))
}
has the following limits:
(1) For y ∈ [a, lt − ),
0 ≤ lim
t↑∞
Xt(δy)
Xt(δlt−)
≤ lim
t↑∞
exp {At(y − (lt − ))} = 0;
(2) For y ∈ (lt + ,+∞),
0 ≤ lim
t↑∞
Xt(δy)
Xt(δlt−)
≤ lim
t↑∞
exp {−At(ω)(y − (lt(ω) + ))} = 0;
(3) For y ∈ (lt − , lt + ),
lim
t↑∞
Xt(δy)
Xt(δlt−)
= +∞.
It follows from dominated convergence theorem that
lim
t↑∞
∫
L
Xt(δy)
Xt(δlt−)
µx(dy) = lim
t↑∞
∫
L
y
Xt(δy)
Xt(δlt−)
µx(dy)
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=
0 if L = [a, lt − ) ∪ (lt + ,+∞)
+∞ if L = (lt − , lt + )
(2.37)
Thus, in the following expression,
rˆ(X∗t , At) =
∫ +∞
a
yXt(δy)µx(dy)∫ +∞
a
Xt(δy)µx(dy)
=
∫ +∞
a
y
Xt(δy)
Xt(δlt−)
µx(dy)∫ +∞
a
Xt(δy)
Xt(δlt−)
µx(dy)
=
(∫ (lt−)+
a
+
∫ (lt+)+
(lt−)−
+
∫ +∞
(lt+)−
)
y
Xt(δy)
Xt(δlt−)
µx(dy) + (lt ± )µx({lt ± })(∫ (lt−)+
a
+
∫ (lt+)+
(lt−)−
+
∫ +∞
(lt+)−
)
Xt(δy)
Xt(δlt−)
µx(dy) + µx({lt ± })
the integrals
∫ (lt+)+
(lt−)− dominate other terms in both the numerator and denom-
inator. In addition,
lt −  <
∫ (lt+)+
(lt−)−
y
Xt(δy)
Xt(δlt−)
µx(dy)∫ (lt+)+
(lt−)−
Xt(δy)
Xt(δlt−)
µx(dy)
< lt + .
Therefore, it follow that
1−  ≤ lim
t↑∞
rˆ(X∗t , At) ≤ 1 + 
and (2.33) follows as c = 1,  is arbitrary, and P(Ω′) = 1.
Theoretical and empirical studies in economics have shown that the co-
efficient of relative risk aversion, inverse of the relative risk aversion coefficient,
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is greater than 1 (see, among others, [5, 15, 17, 38, 62]). Therefore, it is safe
to assume that the support of measure µ in (2.14) should be finite and the
right-end b of the support of µ is no greater than 1 such that
rˆ(x, t) =
∫ b
a
yeyh
(−1)(x,t)− 1
2
y2tµ(dy)∫ b
a
eyh
(−1)(x,t)− 1
2
y2tµ(dy)
≤ b ≤ 1.
Under this assumption, we have the following corollary to Theorem 2.4.1.
Corollary 2.4.1. Suppose the relative risk tolerance function rˆ in (2.14) sat-
isfies
rˆ(x, t) ≤ 1.
for all x > 0, t ≥ 0. Then,
lim
t↑∞
rˆ(X∗,xt , At) = b, a.s.
and
lim
t↑∞
pˆi∗,xt
b · σ+t λt
= 1, a.s.
where b is the right-end of the support of measure µ.
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Chapter 3
Passive and competitive investment strategies
under relative forward performance criteria
3.1 Introduction
This paper contributes to the study of the optimal portfolio decisions
of two fund managers trading in an Itoˆ-diffusion market when there are inter-
actions between them. The type of interaction can be passive or competitive,
and can be either with asset specialization or diversification.
In the passive case, one fund manager, say manager 1, takes the in-
vestment strategy of manager 2 as given, and is concerned with the relative
performance of her portfolio. Thus, instead of her absolute wealth, X1t , she
considers a relative performance metric, denoted by X˜1t , which weighs her
wealth by a power of the wealth of manager 2, X2t . Specifically, the relative
performance metric of manager 1 is defined as
X˜1t :=
X1t
(X2t )
θ1
,
with θ1 ∈ [0, 1] . The parameter θ1 measures the intensity of manager 1′s
relative performance bias.
If θ1 = 0, she does not take into account the actions of manager 2 at
all, and the investment problem reduces to the classical one. When θ1 = 1,
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then the process X2t resembles a traditional benchmark. Besides taking into
account this arbitrary, but fixed, strategy of fund manager 2, manager 1 does
not interact with him at all. Rather, she solves in isolation an investment
problem with a modified “wealth” process. We call this case passive.
There are two sub-cases of passive relative performance. The first is
when each fund manager trades between a common riskless asset and an ex-
clusive stock. This is the case of asset specialization. The two stocks are prox-
ies for two distinct asset classes. Asset specialization occurs frequently and
reflects a well-documented phenomenon that fund managers invest in assets
with which they are familiar (see, among others, [6, 19, 40, 52, 53, 68, 69, 70]).
These works attribute asset specialization to a variety of reasons, with famil-
iarity with a certain sector, reduction of costs to enhance knowledge of new
stocks, trading costs and constraints, liquidity costs and ambiguity aversion
being some of them.
By far, the most important feature when combining relative perfor-
mance and asset specialization is that because of imperfect correlation, each
manager faces an incomplete market problem, parametrized by the exoge-
nously chosen policy of the other manager.
The second sub-case happens when both fund managers trade in the
same market environment, that is, among the riskless asset and the two rep-
resentative stocks. This is the case of asset diversification. It occurs among
peers trading in the same asset class. Frequently, the motivation is to in-
crease money flows (see, among others, [9, 21]). In a different direction, asset
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diversification also occurs in the delegated portfolio management, where the
role of one manager is replaced by the client (see, among others, [43]). In a
related family of models, they also appear in the so-called “Catching up with
the Joneses” literature (see [1, 32]).
An alternative direction is when the two fund managers compete with
each other, in that the investment choices of one affect the other. Then,
both investors solve, under relative performance criteria, interactive optimal
portfolio problems by simultaneously adjusting their policies in response to the
actions of the other manager. We call this case of interlinked asset management
competitive. A natural concept of optimality is the one of a Nash equilibrium.
Competition is well documented in investment practice (see, for exam-
ple, [2, 16, 28, 31, 67]). As in the passive investment direction, there are two
sub-cases, the asset specialization and the diversification ones.
The above cases were recently concisely studied in [8] under the as-
sumptions that both fund managers have power utilities, but with different
risk aversions, and trade in log-normal markets for the same terminal horizon.
The main objective therein is to investigate the link between competition and
asset specialization.
Due to the homogeneity of the risk preferences and the log-normality
assumptions, explicit solutions are obtained for all cases. A detailed qualitative
analysis is, in turn, provided using the ranges of the fund managers’ risk
tolerance coefficients and their bias parameters, the stocks’ correlation and
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their Sharpe ratios.
Herein, we use the work of [8] as a starting point to study more extended
settings by considering Itoˆ-diffusion markets and flexible investment horizons.
The motivation for the latter comes from the fact that fund managers do not
act in a single trading horizon but in rolling ones, from one evaluation period
to the next. While one may argue that once an evaluation period finishes, an
entirely new investment problem can be defined, this is not what happens in
practice, for past performance is taken into account and is not discarded.
We cast the above four problems, namely, with relative passive and
competitive performance concerns, and with and without asset specialization,
in a forward performance setting. Such criteria, were introduced in [55, 56]
and subsequently generalized in [57, 58, 59].
Forward criteria allow for flexible model revision and investment hori-
zons, which are ubiquitous elements in dynamic asset allocation. They are
built on the classical Dynamic Programming Principle (DPP) and define a
process, the forward performance one, with the following properties: compiled
with the wealth process generated by any admissible strategy, the forward pro-
cess is always a (local) supermartingale; there exists an optimal policy that
generates a wealth process when compiled with the forward process yields a
(local) martingale.
We generalize the original definition of forward performance to accom-
modate both cases, the one with passive relative performance and the one
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under competition. For the latter case, we define the concept of a forward
Nash equilibrium.
For the passive cases, with and without asset specialization, we focus
on forward criteria that are locally riskless processes, in that their volatility
coefficient is taken to be zero for all times. This case has been examined in
detail in [58] and provides the simplest case of a forward criterion in general Itoˆ-
diffusion markets. Such a criterion has the interesting property of remaining
time-decreasing for all investment horizons.
When relative performance criteria are involved, however, time mono-
tonicity is not always valid in the asset specialization case. It holds, however,
in the diversification case. For both cases, we derive stochastic PDEs that
the forward criteria are expected to solve and show how the (local) super-
martingality and martingality properties are related to the solutions of these
SPDE. Naturally, the SPDE for the two cases are distinct, reflecting mainly
the market incompleteness of the former market setting. For the latter case,
we argue that, as the relative performance bias parameter θ1 converges to 1,
the forward SPDE converges to the one solved in the benchmark case in [57].
In this case, the forward criterion can be explicitly represented in terms of a
deterministic function compiled with a stochastic market input. When θ1 6= 1,
however, such functional representation is not valid in general and path de-
pendence emerges. This is demonstrated in the CRRA examples we provide,
which are solved explicitly.
For the forward Nash equilibrium, the analogous SPDE is supposed
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to solved a system of ill-posed HJB equations. The derivation and study of
this system is left for future research. For both competitive cases, we provide
explicit examples for CRRA criteria.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we introduce the model
and examine the asset specialization setting. We consider the passive and
the competitive cases, and introduce, respectively, definitions of the relative
forward criterion and the forward Nash equilibrium. We present some general
results and a concrete example for the CRRA criteria. In section 3, we examine
the diversification (no asset specialization) setting, also for the passive and
competitive cases. In analogy to the results of section 2, we introduce the
relative forward criterion and the forward Nash equilibrium, provide some
general results and present the CRRA case. We conclude in section 4 with a
discussion of future research directions.
3.2 Asset specialization and forward relative performance
criteria
We consider a market environment with one riskless asset, and two risky
securities, which serve as proxies of two distinct asset classes. We assume their
prices, S1t and S
2
t , are Itoˆ-diffusions solving
dSit = S
i
t
(
µitdt+ σ
i
tdW
i
t
)
, (3.1)
with Si0 > 0, i = 1, 2.
The processes W 1t and W
2
t are standard Brownian motions defined on a
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filtered probability space (Ω,F, (Ft) ,P), where (Ft)t≥0 is the natural filtration
generated by (W 1,W 2). Their correlation is ρ ∈ (−1, 1) .
The market coefficients µit and σ
i
t, i = 1, 2, t > 0 are Ft-adapted pro-
cesses with values in R+ and R, respectively. The riskless asset, a discount
bond, has an Ft-adapted interest rate process rt > 0, and serves as the nu-
meraire.
The related market price of risk processes are given by
λit =
µit − rt
σit
, (3.2)
i = 1, 2, and it is assumed that for all t > 0, |λit| ≤ C, with C a positive
constant.
In this market, two portfolio managers, indexed by i = 1, 2, trade
between the riskless and the risky securities, specializing in assets 1 and 2,
respectively. Without loss of generality, both managers’ initial endowments
are taken to be the same, denoted by x > 0.
Their portfolio strategies, pi1t and pi
2
t , t ≥ 0, denote the fractions of
fund invested in the risky asset by managers 1 and 2, respectively. They are
taken to be self-financing which together with (3.1) yield that the (discounted)
wealths of manager 1 and 2 solve
dX it
X it
= σitpi
i
t
(
λitdt+ dW
i
t
)
(3.3)
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for i = 1, 2. The set of admissible policies Ai for manager i is defined as
Ai =
{
pii : self-financing and piit ∈ Ft,P(
∫ t
0
(σispi
i
sX
i
s)
2ds <∞) = 1, X it > 0,∀t > 0
}
.
(3.4)
Each manager measures the performance of her strategy taking into account
the policy of the other. Specifically, let us assume that manager 2 follows an
admissible strategy pi2 ∈ A2, which generates a wealth X2t , t > 0, as in (3.3).
Then, the relative performance metric of manager 1 is defined to be
X˜1t :=
X1t
(X2t )
θ1
, (3.5)
with X1t solving (3.3). The parameter θ1 ∈ [0, 1] reflects her relative per-
formance bias, that is the extent to which she biases her objectives towards
relative performance concerns.
When θ1 = 0, the fund manager is not concerned about relative perfor-
mance at all. Then, the portfolio choice problem reduces to the classical one,
in that manager 1 trades on her own without taking into consideration any
investment strategy that manager 2 might follow.
Respectively, if manager 1 follows a strategy pi1 ∈ A1, the performance
metric of manager 2 is defined as
X˜2t :=
X2t
(X1t )
θ2
, (3.6)
with the analogous relative performance bias parameter θ2 ∈ [0, 1].
We then see that the processes (X2t )
θ1 and (X1t )
θ2 can be viewed as
benchmarks for manager 1 and 2, respectively. We stress however that, con-
trary to the classical settings in which the benchmarks are traded processes,
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this is not the case herein due to the asset specialization and imperfect cor-
relation assumptions. Therefore, each manager faces an incomplete market
investment problem.
The above criteria are in accordance with the ones proposed in [8]
in a log-normal market. Namely, if we define the relative return processes
R˜it, i = 1, 2, as
R˜1t :=
X1t
X2t
and R˜2t :=
X2t
X1t
,
with X1, X2 in (3.3), then the relative performance metrics defined in (3.5)
and (3.6) can be written as
X˜1t = (X
1
t )
1−θ1(R˜1t )
θ1 and X˜2t = (X
2
t )
1−θ2(R˜2t )
θ2 .
These are the metrics proposed on page 8 of [8].
Herein we consider a general Itoˆ-diffusion market model, introduce the
concept of relative performance criteria for each fund manager, and find the
associated optimal policies and their wealth processes. As we discussed in the
introduction, we consider two separate cases.
In the first case, the relative performance criterion is passive in the
sense that the policy, with regards to which performance is measured, is taken
to be arbitrary but fixed. There is no other interaction between the two
managers and, thus, each manager solves an individual investment problem
“in isolation”.
In the second case, there is a dynamic, competitive interaction between
the two managers. The action of each manager is not taken as fixed anymore.
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Instead, they continuously adjust their investment policies to the policy of
each other.
As in [8], we assume that both managers have full information of all
fundamentals of the investment environment, even though they do not invest
in both assets. This is an idealized case, partially supported by the results in
[46], where the author argues that each manager can infer these fundamentals
from the other manager’s return, which is observable in practice. We comment
on this limitation in section 4.
Given the distinct nature of the above cases –passive and competitive–
we introduce two new concepts, the forward passive and the forward compet-
itive performance criteria. We will also frequently refer to the latter as the
forward Nash criterion.
3.2.1 Forward relative performance criteria
Each manager takes an investment strategy of the other as given, and
optimizes, for all times t > 0, the output of her relative performance metric.
To measure this output, we introduce a performance criterion, the forward
relative one, modeled as an Ft-adapted process U
i (x, t) for i = 1, 2.
This new criterion is a variation of the original one, proposed by Musiela
and Zariphopoulou (see [55, 56]) and further developed by them and others
(see, [44, 57, 59, 58, 60, 61, 73]).
The main idea for the forward relative performance criterion is as fol-
lows: if manager 2 follows an investment policy, say pi2t , t > 0, then, for any
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strategy pi1 ∈ A1, the process U1(X˜1s , s) is a (local) supermartingale and, fur-
thermore, there exists pi1,∗ ∈ A1 such that U1(X˜1,∗s , s) is a (local) martingale.
The processes X˜1s and X˜
1,∗
s solve (3.5), with pi
1
t and pi
1,∗
t used, respectively.
The analogous conditions hold for manager 2.
As expected, this relative criterion is implicitly and exogenously parametrized
by the generic policy pi2 of the manager 2. We stress, however, that the pol-
icy of manager 2 is taken to be arbitrary but fixed, without assuming any
optimality properties of the policy for manager 2.
We introduce this criterion next. With a slight abuse of notation, we
use x to denote the state process X˜ i, i = 1, 2, given by (3.5) and (3.6) (and
not X i as in (3.3)).
Definition 3.2.1. Let pi2 ∈ A2 (resp. pi1 ∈ A1) be an arbitrary but fixed
admissible policy of manager 2 (resp. manager 1). An Ft-adapted process
U1(x, t) (resp. U2(x, t)) is a forward relative performance for manager 1 (resp.
manager 2) if, for t ≥ 0 and x > 0, the following conditions hold:
i) The mappings x → U i(x, t), i = 1, 2, are strictly increasing and
strictly concave.
ii) For each pi1 ∈ A1, U1(X˜1t , t) is a local supermartingale, where X˜1 is
the relative performance metric given in (3.5). Respectively, for each pi2 ∈ A2,
U2
(
X˜2t , t
)
is a local supermartingale, where X˜2 is the relative performance
metric given in (3.6).
iii) There exists pi1,∗ ∈ A1 such that U1
(
X˜1,∗t , t
)
is a local martingale,
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where X˜1,∗ as in (3.5) with pi1,∗ being used. Respectively, there exists pi2,∗ ∈ A2
such that U2
(
X˜2,∗t , t
)
is a local martingale, where X˜2,∗ as in (3.6) with pi2,∗
being used.
In the above definition, we do not make explicit references to the initial
conditions U1 (x, 0) and U2 (x, 0) , but we assume that admissible initial data
exist such that the above definition is viable. The specification of the class of
admissible initial conditions is a challenging task (see, for example, [10, 58]) -
even in the absence of relative performance concerns - and is currently being
investigated by the authors.
In general, forward performance criteria (relative or not) are Itoˆ-diffusion
processes with non-zero volatility coefficient. Contrary to the classical ex-
pected utility case, the forward volatility process is an investor-specific input.
Once it is chosen, the supermartingality and martingality properties impose
conditions on the drift of the process. Under enough regularity, these con-
ditions lead to the forward performance SPDE (see [59]). Furthermore, de-
pending on whether the forward process is path-dependent or a deterministic
functional of stochastic factors, the forward volatility can be path- or state-
dependent (see, for example, [41, 44, 49, 60, 61, 66]).
Herein, we focus on the simplest possible case, the one of zero volatility.
Such processes are extensively analyzed in [58] in the absence of relative per-
formance concerns. Therein, a concise characterization of the forward criteria
is given together with necessary and sufficient conditions for their existence
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and uniqueness. In that setting, the zero-volatility forward processes are al-
ways time-decreasing processes. However, this is not the case when relative
performance is considered (see (3.13) and (3.21)).
Next we derive a stochastic PDE for smooth relative performance cri-
teria of zero volatility. Namely, we assume that their Itoˆ decomposition
is of the form dU i (x, t) = U it (x, t) dt, i = 1, 2, and that the derivatives
U it (x, t) , U
i
x (x, t) and U
i
xx (x, t) exist a.s. for t ≥ 0.
To ease the presentation, we only state the results for fund manager 1,
since the symmetric ones hold for manager 2.
Proposition 3.2.1. Assume that manager 2 follows policy pi2t ∈ A2. Consider
the stochastic PDE
U1t =
1
2
(
λ1t − ρθ1σ2t pi2t
)2 (U1x)2
U1xx
+ θ1σ
2
t pi
2
t
(
λ2t −
1 + θ1
2
σ2t pi
2
t − ρ(λ1t − ρθ1σ2t pi2t )
)
xU1x −
1− ρ2
2
(θ1σ
2
t pi
2
t )
2x2U1xx,
(3.7)
and assume that, for an admissible initial condition U1 (x, 0) , it has a smooth
solution U1 (x, t) , t > 0, such that the mapping x → U1 (x, t) is strictly in-
creasing and strictly concave in x, for each t > 0.
Let the portfolio strategy pi1,∗t , t > 0, defined by
pi1,∗t = R
1,∗
t
λ1t
σ1t
+ ρθ1
(
1−R1,∗t
) σ2t
σ1t
pi2t , (3.8)
with
R1,∗t := −
U1x(X˜
1,∗
t , t)
X˜1,∗t U1xx(X˜
1,∗
t , t)
, (3.9)
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where X˜1,∗t solves (3.10) with pi
1,∗
t being used. If, for t > 0, pi
1,∗
t ∈ A1 and
X˜1,∗t is well defined, then U
1(x, t) is a forward relative performance process.
Furthermore, the above policy pi1,∗t , t > 0 is optimal.
Proof. Applying Itoˆ’s rule to (3.5) yields
dX˜1t
X˜1t
=
(
λ1tσ
1
t pi
1
t + θ1σ
2
t pi
2
t (
1 + θ1
2
σ2t pi
2
t − λ2t )− ρθ1σ1t σ2t pi1t pi2t
)
dt
+ σ1t pi
1
t dW
1
t − θ1σ2t pi2t dW 2t . (3.10)
Let U1(x, t) be a solution to (3.7) with the aforementioned properties and X˜1t
as in (3.5). Then, applying the Itoˆ-Wentzell formula (see [47]) to U1(X˜1t , t)
gives
dU1(X˜1t , t) = U
1
t (X˜
1
t , t)dt+ U
1
x(X˜
1
t , t)dX˜
1
t +
1
2
U1xx(X˜
1
t , t)d〈X˜1〉t
= U1x(X˜
1
t , t)X˜
1
t σ
1
t pi
1
t dW
1
t − U1x(X˜1t , t)X˜1t θ1σ2t pi2t dW 2t
+
(
U1t (X˜
1
t , t) + U
1
x(X˜
1
t , t)X˜
1
t
(
λ1tσ
1
t pi
1
t + θ1σ
2
t pi
2
t (
1 + θ1
2
σ2t pi
2
2 − λ2t )− ρθ1σ1t σ2t pi1t pi2t
)
+
1
2
U1xx(X˜
1
t , t)(X˜
1
t )
2
(
(σ1t pi
1
t )
2 + (θ1σ
2
t pi
2
t )
2 − 2ρθ1σ1t σ2t pi1t pi2t
))
dt.
Using that U1(x, t) solves (3.7), the above becomes
dU1(X˜1t , t) = U
1
x(X˜
1
t , t)X˜
1
t σ
1
t pi
1
t dW
1
t − U1x(X˜1t , t)X˜1t θ1σ2t pi2t dW 2t
+
1
2
(X˜1t )
2U1xx(X˜
1
t , t)
∣∣∣∣∣σ1t pi1t − ρθ1σ2t pi2t + (λ1t − ρθ1σ2t pi2t )U1x(X˜1t , t)X˜1t U1xx(X˜1t , t)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
dt. (3.11)
The concavity assumption of U1(x, t) implies that the drift term above is non-
positive, and vanishes when
σ1t pi
1,∗
t = (λ
1
t − ρθ1σ2t pi2t )
(
− U
1
x(X˜
1,∗
t , t)
X˜1,∗t U1xx(X˜
1,∗
t , t)
)
+ ρθ1σ
2
t pi
2
t
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= λ1tR
1,∗
t + ρθ1
(
1−R1,∗t
)
σ2t pi
2
t ,
with R1,∗t as in (3.9), and (3.8) follows.
Thus, if pi1,∗t ∈ A1 and the associated wealth processX1,∗t is well-defined,
the process U1(X˜1,∗, t) is a local martingale, otherwise it is a local supermartin-
gale. We easily conclude.
The optimal portfolio pi1,∗t is a linear combination of a myopic-type one,
R1,∗t
λ1t
σ1t
, and a strategy that is proportional to the one followed by manager 2.
The proportionality process depends linearly on the correlation ρ, the relative
performance bias parameter θ1, the ratio of the two volatilities, and the factor(
1−R1,∗t
)
.
The process R1,∗t is the relative risk tolerance given in (3.9). As it is case
in the classical portfolio setting, the cases R1,∗t ≶ 1 render different behavior.
Indeed, we can see, for example, that if both ρ and pi2 are positive, investing
under relative performance criteria yields policies bigger (resp. smaller) than
the myopic-type term if R1,∗t ≤ 1 (resp. R1,∗t ≥ 1).
Note also that if ρ = 0, then pi1,∗t = R
1,∗
t
λ1t
σ1t
. However, while pi2 does not
explicitly appear in the form of pi1,∗t , its effects are present in the metric X˜
1,∗
t
which enters in the definition of R1,∗t .
3.2.1.1 The CRRA case
We provide an explicitly solved example in which fund manager 1 starts
with a power criterion. There is no assumption on the criterion that the
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manager 2 uses, as we only use an admissible policy pi2 chosen by her.
Proposition 3.2.2. Suppose manager 1 starts at t = 0 with a power criterion
of the form,
U1(x, 0) =
1
1− γ1x
1−γ1 , (3.12)
with γ1 > 0, γ1 6= 1. Also, assume that manager 2 follows an admissible
portfolio strategy pi2t , t > 0. Then, the following assertions hold:
i) The relative performance criterion for manager 1 is given by
U1 (x, t) =
1
1− γ1x
1−γ1 exp
(
−
∫ t
0
1
2
1− γ1
γ1
η1sds
)
, (3.13)
where
η1t :=
(
λ1t − δ1t θ1σ2t pi2t
)2
+
(
ρ2(1− γ1)2 + γ1(1− γ1 + 1
θ1
)− (δ1t )2) (θ1σ2t pi2t )2,
(3.14)
with
δ1t := γ1
λ2t
λ1t
+ ρ(1− γ1). (3.15)
ii) The associated optimal portfolio pi1,∗t is given by
pi1,∗t =
1
γ1
λ1t
σ1t
+ ρθ1
(
1− 1
γ1
)
σ2t
σ1t
pi2t . (3.16)
Proof. We look for a criterion in the separable form
U1(x, t) =
x1−γ1
1− γ1Kt,
with K0 = 1 and Kt being an Ft-adapted process, differentiable in t. Using
equation (3.7), we deduce that
1
1− γ
dKt
dt
+ qtKt = 0,
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where
qt :=
1
2γ1
(λ1t − ρθ1σ2t pi2t )2
−θ1σ2t pi2t
(
λ2t −
θ1 + 1
2
σ2t pi
2
t − ρ(λ1t − ρθ1σ2t pi2t )
)
− 1− ρ
2
2
γ1(θ1σ
2
t pi
2
t )
2
=
1
2γ1
((
λ1t − θ1δ1t σ2t pi2t
)2
+
(
ρ2(1− γ1)2 + γ1(1− γ1 + 1
θ1
)− (δ1t )2) (θ1σ2t pi2t )2) ,
(3.17)
with δ1t as in (3.15). Direct calculations then yield (3.13) and (3.14). In turn,
using (3.8), we deduce (3.16).
We easily recover the analogous quantities for fund manager 2, listed
below for completeness and future reference. We have,
U2 (x, t) =
1
1− γ2x
1−γ2 exp
(
−
∫ t
0
1
2
1− γ2
γ2
η2sds
)
, (3.18)
where
η2t :=
(
λ2t − δ2t θ2σ1t pi1t
)2
+
(
ρ2(1− γ2)2 + γ2(1− γ2 + 1
θ2
)− (δ2t )2) (θ2σ1t pi1t )2,
(3.19)
with δ2t := γ2
λ1t
λ2t
+ ρ(1− γ2). The associated optimal portfolio pi2,∗t is given by
pi2,∗t =
1
γ2
λ2t
σ2t
+ ρθ2
(
1− 1
γ2
)
σ1t
σ2t
pi1t . (3.20)
When γ1 = 1, the initial forward process is logarithmic, U
1(x, 0) =
log x. Direct calculations then yield that a relative forward logarithmic crite-
rion is given by the process
U1(x, t) = log x+Kt, (3.21)
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where
dKt
dt
= −1
2
(λ1s − θ1σ2spi2s)2 − θ1σ2spi2s(λ1s − λ2s), (3.22)
and K0 = 0. Therefore,
U1(x, t) = log x−
∫ t
0
(
1
2
(λ1s − θ1σ2spi2s)2 + (λ1s − λ2s)θ1σ2spi2s
)
ds.
The optimal control pi1,∗t is the myopic portfolio λ
1
t/σ
1
t .
As we mentioned earlier, it is not always the case that under passive
relative performance concerns, the zero-volatility criteria are time-monotone.
Indeed, this can be seen from (3.17) and (3.22) where the time derivatives of
the process Kt do not have a fixed sign.
3.2.2 Forward Nash equilibrium
We now consider the case that the two fund managers compete with
each other. Namely, if manager 2 uses policy pi2, then manager 1 optimizes
his performance responding to this strategy, and manager 2 does, in turn, the
same. To measure the performance of their interactive policies, we propose
the concept of forward Nash equilibrium, which we introduce next.
For the reader’s convenience, we will use the notation
X˜1t (pi
∗
2) =
X1t
(X2,∗t )θ1
and X˜2t (pi
∗
1) =
X2t
(X1,∗t )θ2
(3.23)
where X1t , X
2
t solve (3.3) for pi
1 ∈ A1 and pi2 ∈ A2, and X1,∗t , X2,∗t solve (3.3)
with the candidate Nash policies pi1,∗t , pi
2,∗
t used, respectively.
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Definition 3.2.2. A forward Nash equilibrium consists of two pairs of Ft-
adapted processes, (U1 (x, t) , pi1,∗t ) and (U
2 (x, t) , pi2,∗t ), such that, for t ≥ 0,
the following assertions hold:
i) pi1,∗ ∈ A1 and pi2,∗ ∈ A2.
ii) For any pi1 ∈ A1 and pi2 ∈ A2, the processes U1(X˜1t (pi∗2), t) and
U2(X˜2t (pi
∗
1), t) are local supermartingales, with the processes X˜
1
t (pi
∗
2) and X˜
2
t (pi
∗
1)
given by (3.23).
iii) The processes U1(X˜1,∗t (pi
∗
2), t) and U
2(X˜2,∗t (pi
∗
1), t) are local martin-
gales, where
X˜1,∗t (pi
∗
2) =
X1,∗t
(X2,∗t )θ1
and X˜2,∗t (pi
∗
1) =
X2,∗t
(X1,∗t )θ2
.
If, under appropriate integrability conditions, the processes U1(X˜1t (pi
∗
2), t)
and U2(X˜2t (pi
∗
1), t), and U
1(X˜1,∗t (pi
∗
2), t) and U
2(X˜2,∗t (pi
∗
1), t) are, respectively,
supermartingales and martingales, then, for t ≥ 0, we have the following re-
sults. For all pi1 ∈ A1,
E
(
U1(X˜1,∗t (pi
∗
2), t)
)
= E
(
U1(x1−θ1 , 0)
) ≥ E(U1(X˜1t (pi∗2), t)) .
Similarly, for all pi2 ∈ A2,
E
(
U2(X˜2,∗t (pi
∗
1), t)
)
= E
(
U2(x1−θ2 , 0)
) ≥ E(U2(X˜2t (pi∗1), t)) .
In other words, no unilateral deviation in strategy by either manager will result
in an increase in the expected utility of her relative performance metric.
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The specification of the forward Nash equilibrium appears to be in-
tractable for general forward criteria, for one needs to solve the system of
equations 
pi1,∗t = R
1,∗
t
λ1t
σ1t
+ ρθ1
(
1−R1,∗t
) σ2t
σ1t
pi2,∗t
pi2,∗t = R
2,∗
t
λ2t
σ2t
+ ρθ2
(
1−R2,∗t
) σ1t
σ2t
pi1,∗t
with
R1,∗t := −
U1x(X˜
1,∗
t , t)
X˜1,∗t U1xx(X˜
1,∗
t , t)
and R2,∗t := −
U2x(X˜
2,∗
t , t)
X˜2,∗t U2xx(X˜
2,∗
t , t)
.
However, this is in general not feasible since both controlled processes X˜1,∗t , X˜
2,∗
t ,
entering in R1,∗t , R
2,∗
t , depend on pi
1,∗
t and pi
2,∗
t , respectively.
3.2.2.1 The CRRA case
We assume that managers 1 and 2 start at t = 0 with initial criteria of
the form
U i(x, 0) =
1
1− γix
1−γi
for x > 0, γi > 0, and γi 6= 1, i = 1, 2.
The result below yields an explicit construction of a forward Nash equi-
librium under asset specialization.
Proposition 3.2.3. i) Let ρ 6= 0. Under asset specialization, a forward Nash
equilibrium is given by the pairs (U1 (x, t) , pi1,∗t ) and (U
1 (x, t) , pi2,∗t ), where
U1 (x, t) =
1
1− γ1x
1−γ1 exp
(
−
∫ t
0
1
2
1− γ1
γ1
η1,∗s ds
)
(3.24)
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where η1,∗s is as in (3.14) with pi
2,∗
t used instead of pi
2
t . The optimal portfolio
strategy of manager 1 is given by
pi1,∗t =
1
σ1t
(
γ2λ
1
t
γ1γ2 − ρ2θ1θ2(γ1 − 1)(γ2 − 1) + ρθ1
(γ1 − 1)λ2t
γ1γ2 − ρ2θ1θ2(γ1 − 1)(γ2 − 1)
)
.
(3.25)
Respectively,
U2 (x, t) =
1
1− γ2x
1−γ2 exp
(
−
∫ t
0
1
2
1− γ2
γ2
η2,∗s ds
)
(3.26)
with η2,∗s is as in (3.19) with pi
1,∗
t used instead of pi
1
t . The optimal portfolio
strategy of manager 2 is given by
pi2,∗t =
1
σ2t
(
γ1λ
2
t
γ1γ2 − ρ2θ1θ2(γ1 − 1)(γ2 − 1) + ρθ2
(γ2 − 1)λ1t
γ1γ2 − ρ2θ1θ2(γ1 − 1)(γ2 − 1)
)
.
(3.27)
ii) If ρ = 0, then
U1 (x, t) =
1
1− γ1x
1−γ1 exp
(
−
∫ t
0
1
2
1− γ1
γ1
η1sds
)
with η1 =
(
λ1t − θ1ρ(1− γ1) 1γ2λ2t
)2
+ ((1− γ1)θ1 − 1) γ1γ2 θ1(λ2t )2, and
pi1,∗t =
1
γ1
λ1t
σ1t
.
Furthermore,
U2 (x, t) =
1
1− γ2x
1−γ2 exp
(
−
∫ t
0
1
2
1− γ2
γ2
η2sds
)
with η2 =
(
λ2t − θ2ρ(1− γ2) 1γ1λ1t
)2
+ ((1− γ2)θ2 − 1) γ2γ1 θ2(λ1t )2, and
pi2,∗t =
1
γ2
λ2t
σ2t
.
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Proof. At the forward Nash equilibrium, we see from Proposition 3.2.2 that
both optimal equilibrium strategies pi1,∗, pi2,∗ should satisfy the system of equa-
tions 
pi1,∗t −
(
1− 1
γ1
)
ρθ1
σ2t
σ1t
pi2,∗t =
1
γ1
λ1t
σ1t
−
(
1− 1
γ2
)
ρθ2
σ1t
σ2t
pi1,∗t + pi
2,∗
t =
1
γ2
λ2t
σ2t
.
If ρ = 0, the above equations simplify to pi1,∗t =
1
γ1
λ1t
σ1t
and pi2,∗t =
1
γ2
λ2t
σ2t
. If ρ 6= 0,
the solution
(
pi1,∗t , pi
2,∗
t
)
is well defined and given by (3.25) and (3.27), since
det
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1 −
(
1− 1
γ1
)
ρθ1
σ2t
σ1t
−
(
1− 1
γ2
)
ρθ2
σ1t
σ2t
1
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 6= 0,
as, for i = 1, 2, θi ∈ [0, 1] and 1− 1γi < 1. In turn, using (3.13) and (3.18) for
the appropriate auxiliary policies η1,∗t and η
2,∗
t we conclude.
3.3 Diversification (no asset specialization) and relative
forward performance criteria
We now revert our attention to the case where the two managers invest
in the same market, namely, they trade among the common riskless asset and
both stocks. As in the asset specialization case, they are concerned with the
their performance relative to the other manager. In analogy, we have the
passive and the competitive cases, as they were defined in sections 3.3.1 and
3.3.2.
While there are various similarities between the asset specialization and
the diversification settings under relative performance concerns, the fundamen-
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tal difference is that in the former case each fund manager faces an incomplete
market problem while in the latter each faces a complete one. Therefore, un-
der diversification, the relative concerns can be directly related to optimizing
in terms of a benchmark or a traded security. However, because the relative
performance bias parameters θi, i = 1, 2 may be strictly less than 1, certain
scaling properties fail, and it may not be feasible to reduce the problem to a
traditional investment problem with benchmarking.
3.3.1 Passive forward performance criteria
In this section, both managers trade in both asset classes with repre-
sentative prices S1t , S
2
t , t > 0, as in (3.1). To ease the presentation of the
wealth and performance metric processes, we use a different parametrization
of price dynamics, setting
Wt :=
[
W 1t
− ρ√
1−ρ2
W 1t +
1√
1−ρ2
W 2t
]
where W 1,W 2 are the correlated Brownian motions in the last section. Fur-
thermore, we represent the volatility matrix σt and the market price of risk
vector λt as
σt =
[
σ1t ρσ
2
t
0
√
1− ρ2σ2t
]
and λt =
[
λ1t
− ρ√
1−ρ2
λ1t +
1√
1−ρ2
λ2t
]
Then, the (discounted) wealth processes X1t , X
2
t can be written
dX1t
X1t
= σtpi
1
t · (λtdt+ dWt) and
dX2t
X2t
= σtpi
2
t · (λtdt+ dWt). (3.28)
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where the vector pi1t (resp. pi
2
t ) denotes the fraction of wealth manager 1 (resp.
manager 2) invest in both asset classes S1 and S2.
The sets of admissible policies Ai, i = 1, 2 are defined similarly to their
counterpart in (3.4), using now as filtration (FWt )t≥0 the one generated by Wt.
As in the asset specialization case, we define the performance metrics
X˜1t :=
X1t
(X2t )
θ1
and X˜2t :=
X2t
(X1t )
θ2
(3.29)
withX1t , X
2
t solving (3.28) and the relative performance bias parameters θ1, θ2 ∈
[0, 1] .
We also analogously define the passive relative forward performance cri-
teria U i (x, t) , i = 1, 2, adjusting Definition 3.2.1 appropriately for the wealth
processes in (3.28) (instead of (3.3)), and the relative performance metrics in
(3.29) (instead of (3.5) and (3.6)). To ease the presentation, we do not provide
the new definition, since the modification is straightforward. Furthermore, we
also focus on forward criteria that have zero volatility, and assume that the
derivatives U it (x, t), U
i
x(x, t) and U
i
xx(x, t) exist a.s. for all t ≥ 0.
Next, we provide a stochastic PDE that the (passive) relative perfor-
mance process of fund manager 1 satisfies. The arguments are similar to the
ones in Proposition 3.2.1, and are therefore omitted.
Contrary to the asset specialization case, the process U1(x, t) is, for
each x > 0, always time-decreasing. This follows from the form of (3.30),
θ1 ∈ [0, 1], and the spatial strict concavity and strict monotonicity assumptions
for U1(x, t).
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Proposition 3.3.1. Assume that manager 2 uses policy pi2t ∈ A2. Consider
the stochastic PDE
U1t =
1
2
∣∣λt − θ1σtpi2t ∣∣2 (U1x)2U1xx − θ1(1− θ1)2 ∣∣σtpi2t ∣∣2 xU1x , (3.30)
and assume that it has a smooth solution, with an admissible initial datum
U1 (x, 0) , and such that the mapping x → U1 (x, t) is strictly increasing and
strictly concave in x, for each t > 0.
Let the portfolio strategy pi1,∗t defined by
pi1,∗t = r
∗
t σ
−1
t λt + (1− r∗t ) θ1pi2t (3.31)
with r∗t
r∗t := −
U1x(X˜
1,∗
t , t)
X˜1,∗t U1xx(X˜
1,∗
t , t)
,
where X˜1,∗t solves (3.28) with pi
1,∗
t used.
If pi1,∗t ∈ A1 and the solution X˜1,∗t , t > 0, is well defined, then the
process U1 (x, t) is a time-decreasing relative forward performance for manager
1. Furthermore, the above policy pi1,∗t , t > 0, is optimal.
The optimal portfolio pi1,∗t consists of two components. The first is of
myopic-type, equals r∗t σ
−1
t λt. The second is proportional to the policy pi
2
t . The
proportionality process depends on the parameter θ1 and the process 1 − r∗t ,
where r∗t is the optimal relative risk tolerance. As in the asset specialization
case, the cases r∗t > 1 (resp. r
∗
t < 1) are expected to render different signs if
the sign of pi2 is kept constant.
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A special case is when θ1 = 1. Then, the wealth process X
2
t , generated
by the admissible policy pi2, can be identified with the benchmark process Yt
in page 164 of [57]. In this case, the SPDE (3.30) reduces to
U1t =
1
2
∣∣λt − σtpi2t ∣∣2 (U1x)2U1xx .
Following the results therein, we deduce that U1 (x, t) is uniquely represented
as
U1(x, t) = u1
(
x,
∫ t
0
|λ2 − σspi2s |2ds
)
,
where u1 : R+ × [0,∞) −→ R+ satisfies the deterministic constraint u1t =
1
2
(u1x)
2
u1xx
. For the solutions of this pde, we refer the reader to [58]. If, however,
θ1 6= 1, the above reduction is not feasible, except for some special cases.
Analogous results can be derived for the investment problem of manager 2.
3.3.1.1 The CRRA case
We provide an explicitly solved example in which fund manager 1 starts
with a power criterion. As in the asset specialization case, there is no assump-
tion on the criterion that the other manager uses, as we only use an admissible
policy pi2 chosen by her.
Proposition 3.3.2. Suppose that manager 1 starts at t = 0 with a power
criterion of the form
U1(x, 0) =
1
1− γ1x
1−γ1 ,
with γ1 > 0, γ1 6= 1. Also assume that manager 2 follows an admissible port-
folio strategy pi2t , t > 0. Then, the following assertions hold:
97
i) A relative performance criterion for manager 1 is given by
U1 (x, t) =
1
1− γ1x
1−γ1 exp
(
−
∫ t
0
1
2
1− γ1
γ1
ηsds
)
, (3.32)
where
η1t =
∣∣λt − θ1σtpi2t ∣∣2 + γ1( 1θ1 − 1) ∣∣θ1σtpi2t ∣∣2 .
ii) The associated optimal portfolio pi1,∗t is given by
pi1,∗t =
1
γ1
σ−1t λt +
(
1− 1
γ1
)
θ1pi
2
t . (3.33)
When γ1 = 1, the logarithmic relative forward criterion is given by the
process
U1(x, t) = log x− 1
2
∫ t
0
(|λs − θ1σspi2s |2 + θ1(1− θ1)|σspi2s |2) ds.
The optimal control pi1,∗t is then the myopic portfolio σ
−1
t λt.
Note that contrary to the asset specialization case (cf. (3.14)), the
process η1t > 0, t > 0. If γ1 < 1, then U
1 (x, t) > 0 and the time exponential is
decreasing. The reverse properties hold when γ1 > 1. In both cases, for each
x > 0, U1 (x, t) is time-decreasing as argued earlier. As in the power case, for
each x > 0, the above logarithmic process is also time-decreasing.
3.3.2 Forward Nash equilibrium
The forward Nash equilibrium is defined as in Definition 3.2.2 with
the only difference being that the wealth processes X1t , X
1,∗
t and X
2
t , X
2,∗
t
now solve (3.28) with the the appropriate analogous investment strategies.
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As in the asset specialization case, the general case is intractable, due to the
interlinked dependencies among the individual forward performance processes,
the wealth processes and the candidate forward Nash portfolios. An explicit
solution is constructed for initial criteria of power type next.
3.3.2.1 The CRRA case
We assume that managers 1 and 2 start at t = 0 with initial criteria of
the form
U i(x, 0) =
1
1− γix
1−γi
for x > 0, γi > 0, and γi 6= 1, i = 1, 2.
Proposition 3.3.3. Define the constants
c1 =
γ1 − θ2(1− γ2)
γ1γ2 − θ1θ2(1− γ1)(1− γ2) , c2 =
γ2 − θ1(1− γ1)
γ1γ2 − θ1θ2(1− γ1)(1− γ2) ,
and
C1 = (1− θ1c1)2 + γ1θ1(1− θ1)c21, C2 = (1− θ2c2)2 + γ2θ2(1− θ2)c22.
Under asset diversification, a forward Nash equilibrium is given by the pairs
(U1 (x, t) , pi1,∗t ) and (U
1 (x, t) , pi2,∗t ), where
U i (x, t) =
1
1− γix
1−γi exp
(
−
∫ t
0
1
2
1− γi
γi
Ci|λs|2ds
)
and
pii,∗t = ciσ
−1
t λt.
for i = 1, 2.
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Proof. At the Nash equilibrium, we see from the results in Proposition 3.3.1
that both optimal portfolio strategies (pi1,∗t , pi
2,∗
t ) should satisfy the system of
equations 
pi1,∗t −
(
1− 1
γ1
)
θ1pi
2,∗
t =
1
γ1
σ−1t λt
−
(
1− 1
γ2
)
θ2pi
1,∗
t + pi
2,∗
t =
1
γ2
σ−1t λt.
After tedious but routine calculations, we conclude.
The forward Nash equilibria strategies pi1,∗t and pi
2,∗
t are proportional to
the myopic portfolio σ−1t λt. The proportionality constants c1, c2 depend only
on γ1, γ2, θ1 and θ2. Note that pi
1,∗
t depends on c2 while pi
2,∗
t on c1.
3.4 Extensions
In all cases herein, we have assumed that model selection, trading and
relative performance valuation are all aligned and, furthermore, that they
occur continuously in time. In reality, these three fundamental attributes are
not synchronized. A more realistic scenario is when trading takes place more
frequently than model selection, and relative performance evaluation takes
place less frequently than trading. The extreme case is the classical expected
utility problem in which the utility is specified only once, at initial time. With
regards to the relative frequency of trading and model selection, it is more
realistic to assume that the model is selected for some trading period ahead, say
a week, and within this week, trading takes place in discrete or continuous time.
100
When relative performance is involved, the distinct scales of time evolution are
more critical, for each fund manager announces her performance at discrete
times and never continuously.
To incorporate such phenomena in the forward setting, one needs to
work with more general classes of forward performance processes. A recent ef-
fort has appeared in [4] where the concept of predictable forward performance
processes is proposed and an explicit example is provided for a binomial model
with adaptive market parameter selection. One may extend these results in-
corporating relative performance, which however will lead to an incomplete
case that may pose several difficulties.
Another issue is the type of information, under asset specialization, each
fund manager may obtain about each other, namely, her risk aversion, relative
bias, and the stock dynamics. The results in [46] give some partial answers to
how one manager may infer this information from the realized, and publicly
available, returns of the other manager. However, several “under-specification”
issues remain open. It might be more realistic to assume that at the end of
each relative evaluation period, each fund manager receives information about
the performance of the other and, right after, formulates a view about the
possible upcoming performance till the end of the next evaluation period.
This will partially address the absence of complete information under asset
specialization. In this case, injecting personal views could lead to a forward
Black-Litterman type criterion under competition.
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Chapter 4
Modeling realized beta time series using
high-frequency intra-day asset prices
4.1 Introduction
In the single-factor capital asset pricing model (CAPM), the systematic
risk of an asset return, beta, is determined by its covariance with the market
return normalized by the market variance (see, among others, [50, 51, 64]). In
this paper, we investigate the question whether a stock’s beta is constant over
time. If not, an important question is how the time series characteristics of the
moving beta influence our modeling decisions. Specifically, we are interested
in examining the dynamics in beta and modeling beta utilizing high-frequency
intraday asset price data.
An implicit consensus among economists is that betas are indeed time-
varying (see, for example, [34]). Even in the absence of explicit allowance
for non-constant betas, the CAPM is typically implemented using estimation
windows, usually five to ten years (see, among others, [13, 25]). The same is
true for online financial data services. For example, Yahoo finance utilizes the
monthly stock returns in the past three years to calculate the beta value of a
stock, while Google Finance and Bloomberg rely on a five-year estimation win-
102
dow. Furthermore, theoretical and empirical studies in asset pricing are often
carried out in conditional frameworks to allow for time-varying parameters.
We proceed as follows. In section 2 we establish the theoretical frame-
work on which our subsequent statistical analysis is based. In section 3 we
conduct some preliminary analysis on the time series plots of beta and some
related variables. Specifically, we investigate the persistent nature by com-
puting two related statistics and observing the correlograms. In section 4,
drawing insights from [7], we move beyond the point estimate of the true beta
and establish the confidence intervals dependent on the sampling frequency of
our model. In section 5, given our results from the previous sections, we recast
beta in a simple dynamic linear model.
4.2 Theoretical framework
We use the notations in [7]. Suppose the logarithmic price process,
y(t), is a N -dimensional continuous Itoˆ process with the dynamics
dy(t) = µ(t)dt+ Ω(t)dW (t)
where W (t) is a standard N -dimensional Brownian motion, defined on a fil-
tered probability space (Ω,F,P). The coefficients µ and Ω are F(t)-adapted
processes satisfying the appropriate integrability conditions. We treat the Nth
element of y(t) as the log price of the market and the nth element the log price
of the ith individual stock included in the analysis. Similarly, the covariance
matrix Ω contains both the market variance, ΩN,N , and the individual covari-
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ance with the market, Ωn,N .
Next, consider a fixed interval of time of length ~ > 0. For concreteness
we typically refer to ~ as representing a day. Traditional daily returns are
computed as
ri = y(i~)− y((i− 1)~), i = 1, 2, . . .
where i indexes the day. However, our focus will be on the case where we
additionally have M equally spaced intra-~ high frequency observations during
each ~ time period. The jth intra-~ return for the ith period (e.g., if ~ is a
day and M = 1440, then this is the return for the jth minute on the ith day)
will be calculated as
rj,i := y
(
(i− 1)~+ ~j
M
)
− y
(
(i− 1)~+ ~(j − 1)
M
)
, j = 1 . . .M
High frequency returns allow us to compute the realized covariance matrix for
the ith day
[yM ]i =
M∑
j=1
rj,ir
′
j,i
The notation [yM ]i is designed to reflect that this matrix is based on the y
process using M intra-~ observations and computed on the ith day. The reason
for the use of the square brackets will become clearer in a moment when we
recall the idea of quadratic variation. The realized covariation matrix is clearly
different from the empirical covariance matrix of high frequency returns
1
M
M∑
j=1
rj,ir
′
j,i −
1
M2
(
M∑
j=1
rj,i
)(
M∑
j=1
rj,i
)′
=
1
M
M∑
j=1
rj,ir
′
j,i −
1
M2
rir
′
i,
104
which converges to a matrix of zeros in probability as M → ∞. Recall the
definition of the quadratic variation (QV) of y(t) is defined as
〈y〉t = p lim
M→∞
M−1∑
j=0
{y(tj+1)− y(tj)}{y(tj+1)− y(tj)}′
for any sequence 0 = t0 < · · · < tM = t with supj{tj+1− tj} → 0. This implies
that the realized covariance matrix
[yM ]i =
M∑
j=1
rj,ir
′
j,i
P−→ 〈y〉i = 〈y〉~i − 〈y〉~(i−1) =
∫ ~i
~(i−1)
Ω′(t)Ω(t)dt
as M → ∞, meaning realized covariation, [yM ]i, consistently estimates incre-
ments of QV, 〈y〉i.
In other words, by summing up sufficiently finely-sampled high-frequency
returns, it is possible to construct ex-post realized volatility measures for the
integrated latent volatilities that are asymptotically free of measurement er-
rors. This contrasts sharply with the common use of the cross-product of the
~-period returns, ri · r′i as a simple ex-post variability measure. Although the
squared return over the forecast horizon provides an unbiased estimate for the
integrated volatility, it is an extremely noisy estimator, and predictable varia-
tion in the true latent volatility process is typically dwarfed by measurement
error. Moreover, for longer horizons any conditional mean dependence will
tend to contaminate this variance measure.
We now denote the realized market volatility by
vˆ2m,i =
M∑
j=1
r2(N),j,i,
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and we denote the realized covariance between the market and the ith indi-
vidual stock return by
vˆnm,i =
M∑
j=1
r(n),j,i · r(N),j,i.
We then define the associated realized beta as
βˆn,i =
vˆnm,i
vˆ2m,i
.
It is straightforward to check that the realized beta consistently estimates the
underlying integrated beta in the following sense:
βˆn,i
P−→ βn,i =
∫ ~i
~(i−1)
Σ(nN)(u)du∫ ~i
~(i−1)
Σ(NN)(u)du
as M → 0.
Finally, we use the asymptotic theory developed in [7] to assess the
precision of the realized beta βˆ estimating the latent integrated beta β. Under
appropriate regularity conditions that allow for non-stationarity in the time
series, the limiting distribution of realized betas are given by
βˆn,i − βn,i√√√√( M∑
j=1
r2(N),j,i
)−2
gˆn,i
L−→ N(0, 1)
as M →∞, where
gˆn,i =
M∑
j=1
x2j,i −
M−1∑
j=1
xj,ixj+1,i
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and
xj,i = r(n),j,ir(n),j,i − βˆn,ir2(n),j,i
Thus a feasible and asymptotically valid α% confidence interval for βn,i isβˆn,i − zα/2
√√√√( M∑
j=1
r2(N),j,i
)−2
gˆn,i , βˆn,i + zα/2
√√√√( M∑
j=1
r2(N),j,i
)−2
gˆn,i
 ,
where zα/2 is the critical value of the standard normal distribution.
4.3 Empirical analysis
We set out to investigate the realized monthly betas constructed from
intraday returns obtained from TAQ. The Trade and Quote (TAQ) database
contains intraday transactions data (trades and quotes) for all securities listed
on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX),
the Nasdaq National Market System (NMS), and all other U.S. equity ex-
changes.
Specifically, we study the thirty component stocks of the Dow Jones
Industrial Average (DJIA) as of May 2016 with data from January 1, 2010 to
December 31, 2014, as detailed in Table 4.1. We take the market return to be
the adjusted DJIA. While the DJIA has many excellent attributes, one of its
biggest criticisms stems from the fact that it is a price-weighted index. This
means that each company is assigned a weighting based on its stock price. In
our case, the market-cap-weighted S&P 500 index would be a better proxy for
market return; however, the index data is not readily available. Therefore,
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we adjust DJIA by scaling each price vector by its own maximum as well as
taking into account the stock splits. Also, we only consider the stock quotes
from 9:30 EST to 16:30 EST on complete trading days during the time period.
Given that the DJIA stocks are the most actively traded U.S. equities with
a median inter-trade duration at 23.1 seconds, we carry out the analysis at
a 5-minute sampling frequency in order to sufficiently reducing the market
microstructure effects. There are a total of M = 1616 underlying intraday
observations for the monthly beta calculations. The main advantage of using
the intraday returns is that we obtain less noisy measures for the variance and
covariances.
In Figure 4.1 we provide a time series plot of the monthly realized
market variance, which is noticeably persistent. Compared to Figure 4.2,
which shows a screenshot of the S&P 500 volatility index (VIX) during the
same period, our realized market variance displays a similar pattern. It is
interesting to note that the first volatility shock is due to the Flash Crash on
May 6, 2010, where the DJIA had its biggest intraday point drop of about
9%, although the market quickly recovered afterwards. The second sharp rise
in volatility is a result of the stock market fall during August 2011, due to
fears of contagion of the European sovereign debt crisis to Spain and Italy,
as well as concerns over France’s current AAA rating, concerns over the slow
economic growth of the United States and its credit rating being downgraded.
Severe volatility of stock market index continued for the rest of the year.
In Figure 4.3 and 4.4 we display time series plots of the thirty monthly
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realized covariances and realized betas. The realized covariances appear highly
persistent as the realized variance, whereas the realized betas are less persis-
tent in contrast. This is confirmed by the fact that the median Ljung-Box
Q-statistic1 presented in Table 4.2 for up to sixth-order correlation is 22.93 for
the realized covariances, but only 16.13 for the realized beta.2 The impression
of reduced persistence in realized betas relative to realized covariances is also
confirmed by the sample autocorrelation functions for the realized market vari-
ance, the median realized covariances with the market, and the median realized
betas shown in Figure 4.5. Surprisingly, the green market variance correlogram
almost completely overlaps with the red median covariances correlogram. This
reflects a high degree of dependence in the shape of the covariances’ correlo-
grams shown in Figure 4.6.
In contrast, the black median betas correlogram in Figure 4.7 indicates
that there is barely any autocorrelation in the median beta time series beyond
5 months. The intuition is that movements of the realized market variance
are largely mirrored by those of the realized covariances; as a result, the real-
ized betas, ratios of the realized covariances and the realized market variance,
display less autocorrelation. Consequently, there is a lot more heterogeneity
among the thirty different beta correlograms shown in Figure 4.7 than the
1The Ljung-Box Q-statistic tests the null hypothesis that autocorrelations up to lag k
equal zero (that is, the data values are random and independent up to a certain number of
lags–in this case six).
2The Dickey-Fuller statistics in Table 4.2 indicate that unit roots are not present in the
market variance, individual covariances with the market, or individual betas, despite their
persistent dynamics.
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correlations correlograms shown in Figure 4.6.
So far we have largely ignored the presence of estimation error in the
realized betas time series. In Figure 4.8 we plot the point-wise 95% confidence
intervals for the underlying (latent) monthly betas using the continuous-record
asymptotic theory developed in [7] and detailed in the previous section. The
plot directly points to the advantage of using finer samples to improve beta
measures since the lower and upper bound almost overlap on each other. We
zoom in and take a look at three stocks in particular in Figure 4.9: Boeing,
Microsoft, and Du Pont. Compare this to the plot of the 95% confidence bans
for the quarterly beta with daily sampling in Figure 4.10, we see the significant
reduction in measurement error afforded by the use of finer sample intraday
data.
It is also evident from Figure 4.9 that there is noticeable positive depen-
dence in the realized daily beta measures. In other words, the high-frequency
beta measures importantly complement the results for the betas obtained from
the lower frequency daily beta by highlighting the dynamic evolution of indi-
vidual betas.
4.4 DLM framework
As discussed in the previous section, there is strong evidence of a much
lower degree of dependence in the realized betas compared to the realized
market variance and the realized covariances with the market return. There is
clearly some heterogeneity across the stock betas but a standard short memory
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autoregressive process with significantly positive serial correlation for each of
the individual realized betas appears robust across both estimation horizons
and sample lengths.
In light of this, consider the following simple dynamic linear model:
denote yt = βˆt the realized beta and βt the latent integrated beta.
yt = βt + νt (4.1)
βt = a+ bβt−1 + t (4.2)
where νt ∼ N(0, σ2t ) and t ∼ N(0, τ 2t ) are independent, and
σ2t =
(
M∑
j=1
r2(N),j,t
)−2
gˆt.
The measurement equation (1) links the observed realized beta to the latent
true integrated beta by explicitly introducing a normally distributed error with
the asymptotically valid variance σ2t obtained from the continuous-record dis-
tribution in [7]. The evolution equation (2) is a standard AR(1) plus noise
model with potentially time-varying error variance τ 2t , which would help alle-
viate the heteroskedasticity in the realized beta time series. For our relatively
short five-year sample, we set τ 2t to a constant for simplicity.
We can now obtain samples from the joint posterior of (a, b, τ 2, β0:T )
using a MCMC scheme together with the Forward Filtering Backward Sam-
pling algorithm (FFBS) for the posterior latent integrated betas. To this end,
we build a Gibbs Sampler that iterates through the following steps:
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1. Draw (a, b, τ 2, β0) from
p(a, b, τ 2, β0|β1:T , DT ) ∝ p(a|DT , . . . )p(b|DT , . . . )p(τ 2|DT , . . . )p(β0|DT , . . . )
where DT = {y1, . . . , yT} and . . . represent the other parameters in the
joint distribution.
2. Draw β1:T from p(β1:T |a, b, τ 2, β0) by first computing forward moments
via equations, and then sampling backwards βt conditional on βt+1 and
yt via equation. This step is known as the FFBS algorithm (see, among
others, [14, 27]).
Alternatively, Step 1 can be performed by sampling importance resampling,
acceptance-rejection algorithm or Metropolis-Hastings-type algorithms. We
provide some details on the sampler for completeness here.
4.4.1 Step 1: prior specifications and sufficient statistics
Assume the prior distributions of (a, b, τ 2, β0) is decomposed into
β0 ∼ N(m0, C0)
a ∼ N(a0,W0)
b ∼ N(b0, V0)
τ 2 ∼ IG(n0/2, n0s20/2)
for known hyperparameters m0, C0, a0, b0, V0,W0, n0, s
2
0. It then follows imme-
diately from Bayesian derivations for conditionally conjugate families that
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• (a|b, τ 2, β0, β1:T ) ∼ N(a1,W1) where a1 and W1 are given by
W−11 = W
−1
0 +
n
τ 2
, W−11 a1 = W
−1
0 a0 +
1
τ 2
T∑
t=1
(βt − bβt−1)
• (b|a, τ 2, β0, β1:T ) ∼ N(b1, V1) where b1 and V1 are given by
V −11 = V
−1
0 +
1
τ 2
T∑
t=1
β2t−1, V
−1
1 b1 = V
−1
0 b0 +
1
τ 2
T∑
t=1
βt−1(βt − a)
• (τ 2|a, b, β0, β1:T ∼ IG(n1/2, n1s21/2) where n1 and s21 are given by
n1 = n0 + T, n1s
2
1 = n0s
2
0 +
T∑
t=1
(βt − a− bβt−1)2
• (β0|a, b, τ 2, β1:T ) ∼ N(m1, C1) where m1 and C1 are given by
C−11 = C0 +
b2
τ 2
, C−11 m1 = C
−1
0 m0 +
b2
τ 2
β1
4.4.2 Step 2: FFBS
Conditionally on θ = (a, b, τ 2) and assuming the initial distribution
(β0|D0) ∼ N(m0, C0), we obtain the following densities for t = 1, . . . , T :
Propagation density: (βt|Dt−1, θ) ∼ N(αt, Rt) (4.3)
Predictive density: (yt|Dt−1, θ) ∼ N(ft, Qt) (4.4)
Filtering density: (βt|Dt, θ) ∼ N(mt, Ct) (4.5)
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The means and variances for the three densities are provided by the Kalman
recursions :
αt = a+ bmt−1 and Rt = b2Ct−1 + τ 2 (4.6)
ft = αt and Qt = Rt + σ
2
t (4.7)
mt = αt + Atet and Ct = Rt −RtAt (4.8)
where et = yt − ft is the prediction error and At = Rt/Qt is the Kalman gain.
This completes the forward filtering part (see, in more details, [71]).
Given the conditional independence structure of the model, we have
that
p(β1:T |DT , θ) =
T−1∏
t=1
p(βt|βt+1:T , DT , θ)p(βT |DT , θ)
=
T−1∏
t=1
p(βt|βt+1, Dt, θ)p(βT |DT , θ)
Since the joint density of (βt, βt+1|Dt, θ), we can readily obtain the conditional
smoothed density p(βt|βt+1, Dt, θ) = N(ht, Ht) where
ht = mt +Bt(βt+1 − αt+1) and Ht = Ct −B2tRt+1
with Bt = bCt/Rt+1. Therefore, the sampling takes place in a backward order:
first draw βT from p(βT |DT , θ), then draw βT−1 from p(βT−1|βT , DT−1, θ), and
keep on going until we get to β1. Together, β1:T is a draw from the joint
distribution p(β1:T |DT , θ).
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4.4.3 Empirical analysis
The R code used here is included in Appendix A.
Set the hyperparameters as such: m0 = 0, C0 = 4, a0 = 0,W0 = 10, b0 =
1, V0 = 10, n0 = 2, s
2
0 = 2. We collect 10,000 samples after an initial burn
of 50,000 to avoid possible slow convergence of the Markov chain. We also
choose the stock that probably best exemplifies the AR(1) structure based on
the correlograms in Figure 4.7.
Figure 4.11 shows all 10,000 samples from posterior distribution of a, b,
and σ2 as well as their correlograms and histograms. We see that the Markov
chain has converged and there is very little serial correlation in the samples
obtained. Figure 4.12 gives the time series plot of median samples from the
filtering densities for β1:T compared to the actual realization of the betas, while
Figure 4.13 plots the 95% confidence bands for the samples. In Figure 4.14,
we plot a hundred forecasting paths of βt for the next 12 months as well as
the 95% confidence interval.
4.5 Conclusion
We have assessed the dynamics in realized betas, relative to the dy-
namics in the underlying market variance and covariances with the market.
We find that, unlike the realized variances and covariances fluctuate widely
and are highly persistence, the realized beta series, on the other hand, display
much less persistence. A critique of the conditional CAPM is that time-varying
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betas may do more harm than constant betas because it may not be possible
to estimate reliably the persistence and predictability in the individual real-
ized betas. This problem, in our case, has been mitigated thanks to the use of
high frequency data. Using five-minute intra-day return, we manage to create
very narrow 95% confidence intervals for the beta series. We also propose an
AR(1) plus noise DLM model for the realized beta, where the measurement
error follows a normal distribution centered at zero with asymptotically valid
variance given in [7]. This approach helps us obtain samples from filtered
and smoothed true underlying beta series and forecast future betas. It is also
possible to have a more sophisticated representation for the true underlying
beta by utilizing particle filters in order to obtain more accurate short-run
forecasts. We look forward to conducting future research along these lines.
4.6 Tables and figures
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Table 4.1: The Dow Jones Thirty
Ticker Company Name Industry
AAPL Apple Consumer electronics
AXP American Express Consumer finance
BA Boeing Aerospace and defense
CAT Caterpillar Construction and mining equipment
CSCO Cisco Computer networking
CVX Chevron Oil & gas
DD Du Pont Chemical industry
DIS Walt Disney Broadcasting and entertainment
GE General Electric Conglomerate
GS Goldman Sachs Banking, Financial services
HD Home Depot Home improvement retailer
IBM IBM Computers and technology
INTC Intel Semiconductors
JNJ Johnson & Johnson Pharmaceuticals
JPM JPMorgan Chase Banking
KO Coca-Cola Beverages
MCD McDonald’s Fast food
MMM 3M Conglomerate
MRK Merck Pharmaceuticals
MSFT Microsoft Software
NKE Nike Apparel
PFE Pfizer Pharmaceuticals
PG Procter & Gamble Consumer goods
T AT&T Telecommunication
UNH UnitedHealth Group Managed health care
UTX United Technologies Conglomerate
V Visa Consumer banking
VZ Verizon Telecommunication
WMT Wal-Mart Retail
XOM ExxonMobil Oil & gas
Notes: The table summarizes company names, tickers, and industries of the thirty
stocks in the Dow Jones Thirty as of May 2016.
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Table 4.2: The Dynamics of Monthly Realized Market Variance, Covariances,
and Betas
Q ADF(1) ADF(2) ADF(3) ADF(4)
Market Var. 23.39 -3.97 -3.66 -4.16 -3.49
Covariances
Min 8.12 -4.82 -4.51 -4.79 -4.31
Median 22.93 -4.04 -3.68 -4.21 -3.48
Max 41.58 -3.23 -3.34 -3.59 -2.95
β
Min 3.22 -6.33 -5.19 -4.43 -4.14
Median 16.13 -4.02 -3.24 -3.13 -2.71
Max 131.34 -2.32 -1.86 -1.42 -1.60
Notes: Q denotes the Ljung-Box portmanteau statistic for up to sixth-order auto-
correlation, and ADF(i) denotes the augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test with
i augmentation lags. The sample covers the period from January 2010 through
December 2014, for a total of 60 observations. We calculate the realized monthly
realized market variances from five-minute returns.
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Figure 4.1: Time Series Plot of Monthly Realized Market Variance
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Notes: The figure shows the times series of monthly realized market variance. The
sample covers the period from January 2010 through December 2014, for a total of
60 observations. We calculate the realized monthly realized market variances from
five-minute returns.
119
Figure 4.2: Volatility Index (VIX) of S&P 500
Notes: The figure shows a screenshot of the volatility index (VIX) of S&P 500 from
January 2010 through December 2014 from Yahoo Finance.
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Figure 4.3: Time Series Plots of Monthly Realized Covariances
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Notes: The figure shows the times series of monthly realized covariances. The
sample covers the period from January 2010 through December 2014, for a total of
60 observations. We calculate the realized monthly realized market variances from
five-minute returns.
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Figure 4.4: Time Series Plots of Monthly Realized Betas
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Notes: The figure shows the times series of monthly realized betas. The sample
covers the period from January 2010 through December 2014, for a total of 60
observations. We calculate the realized monthly realized market variances from
five-minute returns.
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Figure 4.5: Sample Autocorrelations of Monthly Realized Market Variance,
Median Sample Autocorrelations of Monthly Realized Covariances, and Me-
dian Sample Autocorrelations of Monthly Realized Betas
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Notes: The figure shows the first 36 sample autocorrelations of the monthly realized
market variance, the medians across individual stocks of the first 36 sample autocor-
relations of monthly realized covariances, and the medians across individual stocks
of the first 36 sample autocorrelations of monthly realized betas. The dashed lines
denote Bartlett’s approximate 95% confidence band in the white noise case. The
sample covers the period from January 2010 through December 2014, for a total of
60 observations. We calculate the realized monthly realized market variances from
five-minute returns.
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Figure 4.6: Sample Autocorrelations of Monthly Realized Covariances
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Notes: The figure shows the first 36 sample autocorrelations of the monthly covari-
ances. The dashed lines denote Bartlett’s approximate 95% confidence band in the
white noise case. The sample covers the period from January 2010 through Decem-
ber 2014, for a total of 60 observations. We calculate the realized monthly realized
market variances from five-minute returns.
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Figure 4.7: Sample Autocorrelations of Monthly Realized Betas
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Notes: The figure shows the first 36 sample autocorrelations of the monthly betas.
The dashed lines denote Bartlett’s approximate 95% confidence band in the white
noise case. The sample covers the period from January 2010 through December
2014, for a total of 60 observations. We calculate the realized monthly realized
market variances from five-minute returns.
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Figure 4.8: 95% Confidence Intervals for Monthly Beta, Five-minute Sampling
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Notes: The figure shows the times series of 95% Confidence Intervals for the underly-
ing monthly integrated betas, calculated using the results in [7]. The sample covers
the period from January 2010 through December 2014, for a total of 60 observations.
We calculate the monthly realized beta from five-minute returns.
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Figure 4.9: 95% Confidence Intervals for Monthly Beta of BA/IBM/DD, Five-
minute Sampling
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Notes: The figure shows the times series of 95% Confidence Intervals for the under-
lying monthly integrated betas of Boeing, IBM, and Du Pont, calculated using the
results in [7]. The sample covers the period from January 2010 through December
2014, for a total of 60 observations. We calculate the monthly realized beta from
five-minute returns.
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Figure 4.10: 95% Confidence Intervals for Quarterly Beta of BA/IBM/DD,
Daily Sampling
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
−
1
0
1
2
3
BA
betas$Qquarterdate
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
−
1
0
1
2
3
IBM
betas$Qquarterdate
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
−
1
0
1
2
3
DD
Notes: The figure shows the times series of 95% Confidence Intervals for the under-
lying monthly integrated betas of Boeing, IBM, and Du Pont, calculated using the
results in [7]. The sample covers the period from July 1962 through December 2014.
We calculate the quarterly realized beta from daily returns.
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Figure 4.11: Samples from Posterior Distribution of a, b, and σ2 for Monthly
Realized Beta of IBM
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Notes: The figure shows samples from posterior distribution of a, b, and σ2 for
monthly realized betas of IBM. The sample covers the period from January 2010
through December 2014, for a total of 60 observations. We calculate the monthly
realized beta from five-minute returns.
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Figure 4.12: Time Series Plot of Median Smoothed Samples and Actual Real-
ization for Monthly Realized Beta for IBM
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Notes: The figure shows the time series plot of median smoothed samples (blue)
and the actual realization (black dotted) for monthly realized betas of IBM. The
sample covers the period from January 2010 through December 2014, for a total of
60 observations. We calculate the monthly realized beta from five-minute returns.
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Figure 4.13: Time Series Plot of Median Smoothed Samples and 95% Confi-
dence Bands for Monthly Realized Beta for IBM
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Notes: The figure shows the time series plot of median smoothed samples (blue)
and the 95% Confidence band (red dotted) for monthly realized betas of IBM. The
sample covers the period from January 2010 through December 2014, for a total of
60 observations. We calculate the monthly realized beta from five-minute returns.
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Figure 4.14: 100 Forecasting Paths for the Next 12 Months of Monthly Realized
Beta for IBM and their 95% Confidence Interval
Time
2 4 6 8 10 12
0.
5
1.
0
1.
5
100 Forecasting paths
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
1.
2
1.
4
1.
6
Time
95% Forecasting interval
Notes: The figure shows 100 forecasting paths for the next 12 months of monthly
realized betas for IBM and their 95% confidence interval.
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Appendix
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R code for the DLM model
#########################################################################
# DLM: AR(1) PLUS NOISE MODEL using FFBS
# Observation equation:
# y(t)|beta(t) ~ N(beta(t),sig2_t)
# Evolution equation:
# beta(t)|beta(t-1),theta ~ N(alpha+b*beta(t-1),tau2)
# where theta=(alpha,b,tau2), beta(0) ~ N(m0,C0), alpha ~ N(alpha0,W0),
# b ~ N(b0,V0), tau2 ~ IG(n0/2,n0/2*s0), and sig2_t are known.
#########################################################################
# FFBS - Sampling from p(beta(1:T)|y(1:T),theta).
# MCMC - Sampling from p(beta(1:T),theta|y(1:T)) via Gibbs sampler:
# p(beta(1:T)|theta,y(1:T)) via FFBS.
# p(theta|beta(0:T),y(1:T)) via Bayesian updates
#########################################################################
FFBS <- function(y,alpha,b,sig2,tau2,m0,C0,M){
# number of samples
n <- length(y)
##### Forward Filtering #####
mf <- rep(0,n)
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Cf <- rep(0,n)
# mean and variance of propagation density
a <- rep(0,n)
a[1] <- alpha + b * m0
R <- rep(0,n)
R[1] <- b^2 * C0 + tau2
# auxiliary parameter
B <- rep(0,n-1)
# mean of predictive density = a
# variance of predictive density
Q <- R[1] + sig2[1]
l <- dnorm(y[1],a[1],sqrt(Q),log=TRUE)
# Kalman gain
A <- R[1]/Q
# mean and variance of filtering density
mf[1] <- a[1] + A * (y[1] - a[1])
Cf[1] <- A * sig2[1]
for (t in 2:n){
R[t] <- b^2 * Cf[t-1] + sig2[t]
B[t-1] <- b * Cf[t-1] / R[t]
a[t] <- alpha + b * mf[t-1]
Q <- R[t] + sig2[t]
l <- l + dnorm(y[t],a[t],sqrt(Q),log=TRUE)
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A <- R[t]/Q
mf[t] <- a[t] + A * (y[t]-a[t])
Cf[t] <- A * sig2[t]
}
##### Backward Sampling #####
beta <- matrix(0,M,n)
beta[,n] <- rnorm(M,mf[n],sqrt(Cf[n]))
for (t in (n-1):1){
# mean and variance of conditional smoothed density
mb <- mf[t] + B[t]*(beta[,t+1]-a[t+1])
Cb <- Cf[t] - B[t]^2 * R[t+1]
beta[,t] <- rnorm(M,mb,sqrt(Cb))
}
return(list(beta=beta,l=l))
}
MCMC <- function(y,alpha,b,sig2,tau2,m0,C0,alpha0,W0,b0,
V0,n0,s0,burn,niter){
n <- length(y)
W <- W0
V <- V0
sig2 <- sig2
tau2 <- tau2
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n1 <- n0
s1 <- s0
draw <- c(alpha,b,tau2)
draws <- matrix(0,niter,n+3)
for (iter in 1:niter){
# sample beta(1:n)vrom FFBS
beta <- (FFBS(y,draw[1],draw[2],sig2,draw[3],m0,C0,1)$beta)[1,]
# sampling beta(0)
C1 <- 1/(1/C0+b^2/tau2)
m1 <- C1*(m0/C0+(beta[1]-alpha)*b/tau2)
beta0 <- rnorm(1,m1,sqrt(C1))
beta1 <- c(beta0,beta[1:n-1])
# sampling (alpha,b) from their conditional
BBeta <- cbind(1,beta1)
A0 <- tau2*diag(c(1/W0,1/V0),2)
v <- solve(A0+t(BBeta)%*%BBeta)
m <- v%*%(t(BBeta)%*% beta+A0%*%c(alpha0,b0))
ab <- m+t(chol(v))%*%rnorm(2,0,sqrt(tau2))
alpha <- ab[1]
b <- ab[2]
# sample tau2 from its conditional
n1_new <- n1 + n
s1 <- (n1*s1+sum((beta-alpha-b*beta1)^2))/n1_new
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n1 <- n1_new
tau2 <- 1/rgamma(1,n1/2,n1*s1/2)
draw <- c(alpha,b,tau2)
draws[iter,] <- c(beta,draw)
}
return(draws[(burn+1):niter,])
}
# 95% confidence band
q025 <- function(x){quantile(x,0.025)}
q975 <- function(x){quantile(x,0.975)}
## Simulating DLM
ex <- function(stock,M){
# Hyperparameters
m0 <- 0
C0 <- 4
alpha0 <- 0
b0 <- 1
W0 <- 10
V0 <- 10
n0 <- 2
s0 <- 2
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y <- beta_list[[stock]]
n <- length(y)
sig2 <- (betaSD_list[[stock]])^2
if (n!=length(sig2)) stop("sig2 and y have different lengths")
tau2 <- 1/(n0*s0/4)
burn <- 50000
niter <- burn + M
draws <- MCMC(y,alpha0,b0,sig2,tau2,m0,C0,alpha0,
W0,b0,V0,n0,s0,burn,niter)
betas <- draws[,1:n]
lbeta <- apply(betas,2,q025)
mbeta <- apply(betas,2,median)
ubeta <- apply(betas,2,q975)
draw <- draws[,(n+1):(n+3)]
names <- c(expression(alpha),"b",expression(tau^2))
par(mfrow=c(3,3))
for (i in 1:3){
ts.plot(draw[,i],xlab="iterations",ylab="",main=names[i])
acf(draw[,i],main="")
hist(draw[,i],prob=TRUE,xlab="",main="")
}
par(mfrow=c(1,1))
ts.plot(mbeta,xlab="time",ylab="",lwd=2,
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ylim=range(y),col=4,main=stock)
lines(y,lwd=1,lty=2)
legend(0,2.5,c("Posterior median","Actual realization"),
lty=c(1,2),lwd=c(2.5,2.5),col=c("blue","black"))
par(mfrow=c(1,1))
ts.plot(mbeta,xlab="time",ylab="",lwd=2,
ylim=range(lbeta,ubeta),col=4,main=stock)
lines(lbeta,col=2,lty=2)
lines(ubeta,col=2,lty=2)
# k-steps ahead forecasting
alpha <- draw[,1]
b <- draw[,2]
tau <- sqrt(draw[,3])
k <- 12
yf <- matrix(0,M,k)
yf[,1] <- rnorm(M,alpha+b*y[n],tau)
for (i in 2:k){
yf[,i] = rnorm(M,alpha+b*yf[,i-1],tau)
}
myf = apply(yf,2,median)
lyf = apply(yf,2,q025)
uyf = apply(yf,2,q975)
ind = sample(1:M,size=100,replace=FALSE,prob=rep(1/M,M))
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par(mfrow=c(1,2))
ts.plot(t(yf[ind,]),col=1:20,ylim=range(yf))
title("100 Forecasting paths")
plot(y,xlim=c(1,n+k),xlab="Time",ylab="",main="",
type="l",ylim=range(yf))
lines((n+1):(n+k),lyf,col=1,lwd=3)
lines((n+1):(n+k),myf,col=1,lwd=3)
lines((n+1):(n+k),uyf,col=1,lwd=3)
title("95% Forecasting interval")
}
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